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5Introduction
Maria Golubeva, PROVIDUS
The shortage of public funds that resulted from the global economic crisis has led many Euro-
pean governments to reconsider their priorities and to cut costs where possible. In some cases,
the institutions and policies “left behind” included those dealing with the issues of integration and
inclusion of migrants. In new and old EU Member States the deterioration of the economic
situation has coincided with the growing popularity of nationalist parties such as British National
Party (UK) and Jobbik (Hungary) and added a sharper nationalist edge to discourses on the topics
of identity, immigration, and integration. At a time when economic resources are becoming scarce
and when populations are clamouring for easy solutions to both current and apprehended social
problems, a denial of political pluralism and cultural diversity often leads to demonisation of
minorities and migrants.
The conference “Inclusion Unaffordable? The Uncertain Fate of Integration Policies and the
Demonisation of Minorities and Migrants in Central and Eastern Europe”, held in Riga in No-
vember 2009, has given occasion to researchers looking at migration and integration issues in
various parts of Europe to compare their impressions of recent developments in the field of integra-
tion policies. The result was a lively discussion that lasted for two days and gathered scholars,
policy analysts and NGO representatives from 9 countries. This volume contains the slightly ex-
tended versions of conference papers presented by participants from academia and think-tanks.
The publication contains several papers addressing normative and political perspectives on
integration. As Merja Pentikäinen’s article on integrated society and human rights indicates, de-
bate on what is needed to create an integrated society is still required both at the EU level and
within the Member States. There is still too much rhetoric and ideology and too little participa-
tion put into the process of defining the elements that keep society together. Legal and political
regulation of minority rights often falls short of addressing the complexity of issues related to the
coexistence of multiple cultures and languages within one polity, and public opinion is often
swayed in the direction of suspicion and distrust towards “new” minorities. While attempts to map
the similarities and differences between European national minorities and new minorities formed
as a result of recent immigration may be an interesting exercise, they present an uncertain basis
for policy, as the paper by Yves Plasseraud in this volume demonstrates.
The policies that governments adopt towards cultural diversity should ideally be guided by
a thorough understanding of the value of culture for the functioning of society, not by mere as-
sumptions about the meanings of “culture” and “multiculturalism”. As Tove Malloy argues in this
volume, discussions of the virtues and failures of multiculturalism may be pointless if no value
is attached to the notion of culture in the public space, which is often understood superficially
or not at all by those who seek easy and quick solutions to the challenges presented by societal
diversity. Malloy’s emphasis is on diversity management as the way towards social cohesion, re-
quiring a change in institutions and not merely in policies. The examples of Macedonia and Latvia
in the papers by Zhidas Daskalovski and Feliciana Rajevska demonstrate that political responses
to societal diversity are not always led by normative perspectives and may be a result of external
pressures, combined with limited understanding of the values of social cohesion.
The effort of radical right-wing parties in Europe to keep alive the fear of cultural diversity is
described in the papers of Robert Gould, who looks at the rhetoric of the Right on migrants and
minorities, and Maria Golubeva and Iveta Kažoka, analyising the discourses of ethnic difference
in political rhetoric in the Latvian Parliament and media. The banality of ideological clichés and
verbal and visual communication may be key to the relative success of right-wing nationalist par-
ties such as the BNP and Jobbik, but in the cases when ethnic rhetoric obstructs political co-
operation between citizens of different ethnic groups, the result is a poor quality of democratic
political processes, as the case of Latvia demonstrates.
The papers by Laura Kirss and Linda Curika constitute a special section of the present vol-
ume, dealing with the conditions of civil acculturation in separate schools for ethnic majority and
minority students. The findings of the international study Divided education, divided citizens,
conducted in a number of countries including Latvia and Estonia, demonstrate that separate
schools for students of different ethnic and linguistic groups often maintain vastly different civic
attitudes and values, and often serve to compensate the sense of unfairness and exclusion that
exists among minority teachers and students.
1 The presentation was based on the doctoral dissertation of Merja Pentikäinen, Creating an Integrated Society and
Recognising Differences: The Role and Limits of Human Rights, with Special Reference to Europe, Acta Universitatis
Lapponiensis 140, Lapland University Press, Rovaniemi 2008. The research contains a comprehensive analysis of the
role of human rights in advancing integration processes. It aims at clarifying the content of the concept of integration
when used in the area of human rights, including how it relates to the concepts of inclusion and assimilation. It also
looks in depth into the views on integration put forth by three international bodies: the Advisory Committee of the
Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the European Commission against
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). In addition, some
remarks on the usage of the concept of integration within the European Union are put forth.
* Merja Pentikäinen, LL.D., is Professor of International Law (acting) at the University of Turku, Finland.
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Part I
Policies dealing 
with diversity and migration: 
normative perspectives and 
political reactions
An Integrated Society and Human Rights1
Merja Pentikäinen*
Increased migration and intensified demands by “old” minorities to recognise their special
characteristics since the end of the Cold War have propelled the issue of integration into the centre
of international and national debates. These debates revolve around the questions of diversity
and differences, in practice, how groups characterised by various differences are accommodated
in society. Dealing with differences and managing diversity has become one of the most impor-
tant challenges that contemporary societies are facing. “Integration talk” in the sphere of human
rights is visibly linked to debates on social cohesion, identity discourses and recognising differ-
ences, particularly in the public sphere.
Human rights play a part in the efforts to address the challenges of building and maintain-
ing diverse yet integrated societies. The concept of integration has been increasingly used in the
area of human rights so that it has become a fashionable concept repeatedly employed, but, as
a rule, not defined. It is used with slightly varying emphases, and integration of persons belonging
2 The knowledge of the official language(s) of the host society is strongly stressed. The international bodies underline
also the possibility to maintain one’s mother tongue.
3 In this context the international bodies have addressed the importance of nationality/citizenship.
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to groups defined by the features of ethnicity, culture, language or religion has received most at-
tention. On the basis of international documents adopted by states, states appear to be particu-
larly concerned about the integration of persons belonging to “new” (immigrant) minorities. The
international bodies, for their part, address visibly also the integration of persons belonging to
“older” minorities. 
Elements of Integration
Since integration is not a normative concept, but rather a process, the content given to it is
not very easy to define, but rather it often remains unclear. The situation is complicated by the
fact that the content given to integration appears to differ depending on the groups discussed. In
the case of integrating persons belonging to such groups as women, children, persons with dis-
abilities and the elderly, the principles of equality and non-discrimination are emphasised. Inte-
gra tion is endowed with different elements when it concerns persons belonging to “older” national
or ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious minorities, as compared to “newer” (immigrant) minorities
characterised by the same kinds of features. This undoubtedly echoes the fact that particularly
the characteristics of “older” minorities (and indigenous peoples) have received positive attention
from states, which is also visible in the international norms on minorities (and indigenous peoples). 
The particular attention paid to the integration of persons belonging to groups with the fea-
tures of ethnicity (ethnic origin), culture, language or religion may be viewed as justified since ac-
commodating these kinds of groups in society tends to entail special challenges in the efforts to
create an integrated society, managing diversity and preventing social unrest. In the case of these
persons the human rights norms and the international bodies underline the importance of the firm
application of the principles of equality and non-discrimination, fight against racism and other
forms of intolerance, attention to language questions,2 participation,3 education, interculturalism,
contacts and dialogue, family reunification, as well as access to health care and other social serv-
ices. The reciprocal nature of integration, i.e. viewing integration as a two-way process necessi-
tating measures from the host society and individuals belonging both to the majority and
minorities is highlighted. The Council of Europe summit documents note expressly the role of
sports in advancing integration efforts.
Among the important elements of integration the international bodies have drawn attention
also to such issues as training of various officials, policing in multiethnic societies, role of the
media, significance of legal statuses, housing policies, offering persons information about the
host society and rights and regulations in force, and involving various actors, including business
sector, in integration efforts. The bodies have called for adopting a comprehensive immigration
and/or integration plan, strategy or policy in states. They have also viewed it being of utmost im-
portance to promote public understanding of and support for governmental integration policies
among both minority groups and the population at large.
9Integration can also take place within a variety of contexts. The human rights norms and the
views of international bodies include references to integration in(to) society or in(to) a commu-
nity, social integration, local integration, as well as integration in the areas of education, partici-
pa tion and employment.
Challenges
From the viewpoint of states the question of integration is pregnant with tension between ac-
knowledging differences and preserving social cohesion. International human rights instruments
reflecting the views of states establish links between social cohesion, integration, differences, 
tolerance and common values. The problem is, however, that references to these kinds of broad
and vague elements are insufficient to provide tools to address concrete challenges faced at the
societal level. While elements of social cohesion appear to be equated with many elements linked
to building of an integrated society, what is meant for instance by common values and the de-
mand of tolerance in practical terms remains highly unclear. The problem with tolerance is that
the contemporary “tolerance talk” in Europe lacks coherent discussion on the objects and limits
of tolerance. 
Both the views of states and the views expressed by international bodies suggest that inte-
gration is different from assimilation, and that assimilation, which was the prevalent and openly
accepted policy orientation in the past, has nowadays been replaced with a more positive con-
cept of integration giving some acknowledgement to differences. However, in practice the divid-
ing line between these two concepts remains thin. A closer look at international norms adopted
by states reveals that states’ cautiousness to acknowledge differences is recurrent also vis-à-vis
“older” minorities and indigenous peoples. In real life situations it is also often impossible to say
when integration turns into assimilation. 
Persistence of assimilation is closely associated with nation-building and national identities.
Difficulties in granting specific rights or entitlements to minorities in the processes of nation-
building are familiar in Europe where state borders have been redrawn a number of times in the
past. In this situation particularly new states have consolidated their national identities, but an
assimilation orientation has persisted even in states that have long since established their inde-
pendence. It suffices to mention the policy followed in France and the rejection of the official
recognition of minority entitlements. It is important to realise that the assimilation orientation is
characterising even broader concepts such as nation, state, and even democracy which have
often come to favour sameness. However, an emphasis on assimilation and pressure of sameness
have not proven to be viable policies in societies characterised by diversity. Many events across
Europe, including the violent conflicts in a number of French cities in 2005, call into question the
policy of non-recognition of differences. The way forward should include opening up the broader
concepts such as nation, state, nation/state identity as well as European identity, and being more
receptive to differences and diversity existing in societies. 
There still exists a need to clarify the content of integration and particularly its relationship
to assimilation – as well as to inclusion. Nevertheless, on the basis of views expressed by the
states and reflected in more recent international human rights documents, and the views voiced by
the international bodies, one can detect some added value in the notion of integration as compared
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to assimilation and inclusion. These include the departure from the traditional view of seeing dif-
ferences generally as negative and attach a more positive value to differences (especially those
related to ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious features). The area of education is strongly em-
phasised as the locus of information on diversity and various groups existing in society. Integra-
tion should also entail the possibility to learn and maintain one’s mother tongue. While integration
is viewed as a two-way process, it envisages a particularly active role for states in incorporating
in(to) society persons belonging to various groups. This active role of states includes, for instance,
offering high-quality language courses for all needing them.  
Integration as State Interest
Governments of many European states have only recently realised that integrating persons
belonging to various groups in(to) society is crucial for the functioning and viability of society. 
A society lacking cohesion, a sense of belonging, and integration is, and also should be, of great
concern for the states. International bodies have highlighted some risks stemming from a non-
integrated society. Among them is the risk of identity-based withdrawal and radicalisation, i.e. that
persons lacking reference points in society may react to exclusion by establishing other reference
points through their affiliation with an ethnic or religious community and develop even violent 
attitudes towards other communities. Failure to integrate societies has been linked to instability,
and the lack of integration weakens both the security and unity of a state.  
Against this background, i.e. seeing the importance of integration for the viability of the whole
society, paying attention to integration of individuals belonging to various groups should be among
the political priorities of governments. Integration as opposed to segregation and exclusion, and
also giving positive recognition to (certain) differences is undoubtedly the policy enabling the cre-
ation of an integrated society.
Further exchange of views on concrete elements needed to create an integrated society is still
required both at the international level and at national level in various European states. There is
still a need to make concrete the elements that keep society functioning and preserve it from dis-
integrating. Among the key elements is integration through participation and nurturing individuals’
sense of belonging. A good starting point is also a more positive attitude towards differences, ac-
know ledging differences of persons belonging to various groups, and seeing differences (from the
outset) as an asset and source of enrichment, not as a burden and/or threat. 
What is additionally needed are discussions on the limits of differences, i.e. what cannot be
accepted in the light of human rights values upheld in Europe. More attention should be paid to
the role of religion and religious differences in integration processes. All this also relates to the
need to clarify the talk on tolerance. Furthermore, various dimensions affecting integration
processes (gender, age, etc.) have to be considered. And vulnerable groups (such as the Roma,
migrant workers, non-EU citizens, trafficking victims, etc.) must be drawn special attention to.
Since each state and society has its own dynamics with diversity existing therein, the spe-
cific situation in each country affects integration processes and determines concrete integration
measures and their emphases. Integration is contextual in the sense that there are no “one size
fits all” solutions, but that concrete integration measures must be designed to take the specific
circumstances in each country into account in order to manage and implement any successful in-
tegration policies. This effort includes clarifying the roles of different stakeholders (the host state,
the majority, the persons belonging to minorities) in the processes of integration.
The Role of Human Rights in Integration Processes
The human rights regime, with its important emphasis on the equal value of all human 
beings and the underlying principles of equality and non-discrimination, is among the elements
advancing integration. While human rights play their part in the efforts to address the challenges
of maintaining diverse yet integrated societies, there should also be a critical look at the struc-
ture and content of the existing human rights regime. There is room to develop it to support bet-
ter integration of individuals and to pay more attention to the most vulnerable groups. Among
other things, the divide between “old” and “new” minorities upheld by governments and written
into the international human rights norms should be rethought in the era of increasing cross-
border mobility of individuals.
* Director, European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), Flensburg, Germany and External Professor, University of South-
ern Denmark, Sonderborg, Denmark. 
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The Aspect of Culture in the Social Integration 
of Ethnic Minorities: Towards a Politics 
of Cultural Diversity Management
Tove H. Malloy*
Introduction
With the public opinion in recent years having soured on multiculturalism, conflicts over cul-
ture have intensified in the public sphere of culturally diverse societies. Strong articulations against
accommodating cultural difference have swung the pendulum back towards the neutral liberal
state away from the model of multiculturalism. There have been attempts to promote cultural di-
versity as an instrumental value, but the notion that de facto culturally diverse societies are more
likely to prosper is little appreciated in political debates. Under the pressure of the economic cri-
sis, cultural and ethnic minorities have become the scapegoats of governments and lawmakers
alike. However, culture is everywhere and forms part of everything one does in life. Culture is a
vital aspect of the young child learning effectively in kindergarten and school, it is the major rea-
son why individuals have a sense of belonging and well-being, it is indispensable to people’s abil-
ity to perform in society, both in the private and the public sphere, and indeed it is a major reason
why one feels included rather than excluded. Culture is thus both an objective and a process. Cul-
tural vitality, cultural diversity and global ethics depend on the freedom of cultural expression, par-
ticipation in cultural creation, access to cultural activities and the right to have a cultural identity,
including verification of the strengthening of identity, sovereignty, visibility and development as
well as opportunities in all sectors of public life. This is not to argue that society does not have
a problem with culture and that culture has no implications for politics. Certainly, there is a tension
between culture and social cohesion. This is why good cultural diversity management schemes
must be designed. 
In the following, I will discuss culture in relation to the social integration of minorities. First,
a brief examination of the concept of culture and its complications in multicultural societies will
be offered. Next, I turn to the political implications of cultural contestations in the public sphere
and discuss this in terms of social cohesion and multiculturalism. Arguing that cultural contest-
ations in the public sphere are to be fostered rather than feared, I provide a brief discussion of
models of multiculturalism. In concluding, I suggest that the political implications of cultural 
diversity involve both a management scheme that is normative and an ethical public sphere. 
Mutual respect is therefore a core component of managing cultural diversity.
4 Ballard argues that “cultural systems are not God-given: rather they are always and everywhere the creation of their
users. As a result they are never fixed and static, but are constantly being rejigged, reinterpreted and indeed reinvented
by their users. In that respect processes of cultural change are simply a mark of human creativity. New ideas, new per-
ceptions, new inventions and new fashions frequently spread like wildfire…” (Ballard, 2002, 13).
5 As argued by Pierre Bourdieu, cultural capital is a major element in rendering individuals capable of participating in
society. Cultural capital refers to the symbols, ideas, tastes, and preferences that can be strategically used as resources
in social action (Bourdieu, 1977). These strategic tools embody the individual’s socialized tendencies or dispositions
to act, think, or feel in a particular way, and they can also be converted into other forms. Thus, parents can endow
their children with the linguistic and cultural competences that will give them a greater likelihood of success at school
and at university. Similarly, parents who are not able to do this will not have successful children. Cultural capital is there-
fore very closely linked to the ability to acquire economic capital and hence to succeed in society. In fact, the two types
of capital reinforce each other. 
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What is Culture?
Anthropologists operate with different categories of cultural definitions based on history, be-
haviour, norms, functions, rational and structural as well as symbolic observations (Kroeber and
Kluckhohn, 1952). A so-called “baseline” definition of culture breaks it into three categories con-
stituting (1) systems of meaning, referring to negotiated agreements about norms and conventions,
(2) ways of organising society, and (3) distinct features and techniques of the group carrying the
culture. These three categories may also be formulated in a simpler way: What people think,
what they do, and what they produce. Moreover, culture has also been compared to the individ-
ual’s use and understanding of language, namely that it is learned and transmitted through be-
haviour (Ballard, 2002). Because learning is such an important aspect of cultural behaviour,
sociologists argue that education is essential to the reinforcement of cultural values and the sur-
vival of cultures. Finally, it is important to note that culture is a social phenomenon fundamen-
tally constructed by human beings and thus constantly changing.4 It is thus a fundamental
mistake to see culture as an essentialized notion (Phillips, 2007). In fact, essentializing culture
is precisely what limits people’s ability to manage culture in the public sphere. 
At the same time, preserving culture in the public sphere is necessary. One cannot assume
that when entering public spaces, the individual suddenly sheds his or her cultural identity, or his
or her cultural capital.5 Culture is an element of the individual no matter whether one finds one-
self in public or in the privacy of homes and families. Culture is thus an end in itself. The indi-
vidual’s culture must be part of the primary goods that she is given at birth and with which she
grows up (Kymlicka, 1989). Even if at some point an individual decides to change culture – as
difficult as this may be – the need for drawing on the inner resources of the culture are never-
theless there. This argument has been adopted also by economists who argue that in the econ-
omy “culture counts” (Di Maggio, 1994). Economists support the view that individual economic
action is based on culturally engendered capabilities. The idea that capabilities are fostered
through culture relies on the view that certain functions are particularly central in human life, and
these functions render the human being a dignified free being capable of shaping her life in co-
operation and reciprocity with others (Sen, 1999, Nussbaum, 2000). A human life is shaped by
these human powers of practical reason and sociability, and each human being is thus a bearer
of cultural value (Raz, 2005). In other words, the value of culture must be appreciated as a valu-
able contribution to the individual’s development and capability to function in society, including
the individual’s capability to act in the economic sphere. Since the economy is a public sphere,
it is difficult to argue for a cultural-free public sphere. 
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The problem of dividing human life into public and private spheres haunts many theories of
society. This problem is particularly acute because cultural relations cannot be separated from
other social relations and treated in isolation (Tully, 1995). “Culture is a way of relating to others
in any interaction, a way of following or challenging a social rule, and so a dimension of any social
relation, from a cultural slur in the workplace to the relations among nations” (Tully, 1995, 15).
Put in terms of cultural action, one can argue that different ways of life are not simply different
patterns of physical movements. “The physical movements only have meaning to us because
they are identified as having significance by our culture, because they fit into some pattern of ac-
tivities which is culturally recognized as a way of leading one’s life” (Kymlicka, 1989, 165). The
relation between culture and social action is thus at the crux of the matter. Cultural values only
exist if there are social practices sustaining them (Raz, 2005). In fact, according to the so-called
“social dependence thesis” the social practices sustaining cultural values are essential for indi -
vi duals to be the bearers of these cultural values. Cultural values “are those values [the] instanti -
ation of which generally depends on people who have the concept of the value, or of some fairly
closely related value, acting for the reason that their action or its consequences will instantiate
it, or make its instantiation more likely (Raz, 2005, 33). In other words, individuals are de-
pendent on their social environment for reinforcing their cultural values, norms and conventions. 
Cultural Contestations
If one accepts that culture is everywhere and in both the public and the private spheres, then
there will of course be contestations between cultures. Disagreements about values, norms and
responsibilities will happen. Boundaries are drawn and exclusion happens. Social exclusion is an
inter-human process determined by the mechanisms of social identification and contra-identifi-
cation or the reality that one has a fundamental need to achieve a positive cultural identity (Con-
nolly, 2002 [1991]). Moreover, it may be assumed that this mechanism induces people to
perceive their in-group as superior to other ethnic out-groups. Thus, cultures are formed through
complex dialogues with other cultures. The demarcations of cultures and of the human groups
that are their carriers are extremely contested, fragile as well as delicate. To possess the culture
means to be an insider. Not to be acculturated in the appropriate way is to be an outsider. Hence,
the boundaries of cultures are always securely guarded, their narratives purified, their rituals care-
fully monitored (Benhabib, 2002). These boundaries circumscribe power in that they legitimize
its use within the group. Cultural hegemony is therefore part of an ongoing process where bound-
aries change constantly according to influences from a variety of sources, including ethnic mobi-
lization.
The process towards ethnic consolidation, or closure as it is called, happens in all cultural
landscapes where ethnicity is a mobilizing factor. Ethnicity is cultural articulation or the glue that
binds with a view to consolidate against a common enemy and make the boundaries fixed. Hence,
the majority as well as a minority can seek ethnic closure in the attempt to outdo the other groups
in the competition about hegemonic positions. One may speak of ethnicity as a construction of a
collectively self-interested sense of social solidarity which is achieved through the articulation of
a specific set of cultural symbols (Ballard, 2002, 34). When the lines are drawn in the sand in
the cultural market place, social exclusion based on ethnic mobilization, ethnic boundaries, and
ethnic closure happens. And if a group achieves a hegemonic position in society by seeking eth-
nic closure, ethnic exclusionism happens (Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007). The para-
6 According to Will Kymlicka, seeing cultural diversity as instrumental helps the government achieve certain goals
(Kymlicka, 1995). Governments should consider cultural diversity instrumentally good because it provides educational
benefits, aesthetic pluralism, value pluralism, exchange of methods and ideas. Seeing cultural diversity as a means to
achieving a good society has of course political implications in the way we organise our societies.
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digm called cultural pluralism is in reality ethnic pluralism. Cultural hegemony based on ethnic
exclusionism is therefore part of the everyday ethnic struggles in society. 
The normative response to this dismal description of cultural relations is of course cultural
diversity. The notion of cultural diversity is interesting because it is used in several ways, as both
positive and negative. Diversity shortly put is a question of different people and different groups
living together and organizing their society. The problem with cultural diversity is that if the for-
mer is negated, the latter cannot be seen as holding any value. That is, if individuals do not see
the value of culture as an end, they cannot accept diversity as an end. This thus prevents some
people from seeing cultural diversity as something positive. However, if cultural diversity is seen
as a positive notion of value to society, then one will also be able to see the value of cultural 
diversity as an improvement to society. In other words, one would be able to see cultural diver-
sity as an instrumental value as well as a moral value. One could therefore argue that anyone who
is not able to see cultural diversity as a positive notion is in fact negating his or her own culture.6
Political implications of Culture
There is no question that including culture in the public sphere will have implications for poli -
tics. Cultural contestations engender different views about public goods, their protection and en-
joyment, and the sharing of public goods is arguably a primary object of politics. In fact, it is very
much about how public goods are shared. Sharing public goods may thus be subjected to logic
of hegemony or a logic of cultural diversity, depending on one’s view of cultural pluralism. Does
one cultural or ethnic group exercise hegemony in the public space and public debates, or is cul-
tural diversity the instrumentality that counts? Either way, cultural contestations are clearly part
of political life. However, one may be more democratic than the other. The political models that
societies adopt with a view to sharing public goods determine how public goods are shared. This
means that depending on the political model, social cohesion may be achieved to various degrees.
Culture could therefore be seen as a threat to unity rather than as creating peaceful societies. 
Social cohesion and Cultural Contestations
Put differently, culture in the political sphere has implications for the social cohesion that
binds societies together. The ideal of social cohesion often becomes obscured in ethnically and
culturally divided societies after historical upheavals or major socio-economic changes. This has
happened in several of the new democracies that emerged after the end of Communism in Eu-
rope. Power changes hands, ideologies are discarded and new ones adopted or old ones recycled.
Societal groupings change situation; majorities become minorities or vice versa. Pressures mount
to stabilize the state, unite the people and protect the nation. The moral vocabulary of social co-
hesion includes loyalty, solidarity, virtue, common values, patriotism and unity. The normative vo-
cabulary prescribes equality, participation, inclusion, sovereignty and self-determination, while the
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ethical vocabulary comprises tolerance, respect, recognition, dialogue and co-operation. How-
ever, the interpretation of universal concepts is often taken for granted, while the social vocabu-
lary of culture, community, diversity, added value, identity and difference is often neglected. And
when deemed relevant, social situations are often over-interpreted to fit certain ideological ends.
As a result social cohesion ideals after seismic changes may not reflect the actual situation on
the ground (Malloy, 2009). 
Social cohesion is of course a contested concept. It has been suggested that belonging, in-
clusion, participation, recognition and legitimacy are key concepts to take into consideration as
well as “ties that bind,” such as values, identity, culture, differences and divisions, inequalities
and inequities, cultural diversity and geographical divisions (Jenson, 1998). Social glue in terms
of associations, networks and infrastructure must also be in focus. In fact, social glue is more than
institutions; it is communication and the moral regulation that people create as a result of their
inter-dependence (Scott and Marshall, 2005: 173). This has been called organic solidarity which
is fostered through increased intensity in communication between segments of society (Durkheim,
1950). This ongoing social contact between groups and individuals creates the moral and social
consensus which is a pre-condition for social integration. This is why it has been suggested that
social cohesion defines the role that social connectedness plays in people’s ability to communi-
cate across social, economic, cultural and ethnic groups (Ministry of Culture, 2006). However,
countries are unique, and countries require different models of social cohesion. Moreover, social
cohesion need not mean beautiful harmony and common values only. It may also mean divergence
and disagreements, or what has been termed “constitutive tensions” (Taylor, 2001). Indeed, the
struggle for recognition may be seen as a permanent state of social cohesion and indeed of democ-
racy (Honneth, 1995). In fact, it is common knowledge that social policies which do not account
for difference and diversification will not secure social cohesion (Delanty and O’Mahony, 2002).
The interpretation of the notion of social cohesion is therefore a powerful tool. 
From Politics to Policy 
The institutional regulation of cultural diversity in multicultural societies can follow divergent
approaches. States face great difficulties when seeking to conceptualize multicultural policies
based on liberal democratic theory. From the core principles of liberal democracy has sprung a
number of different views of multiculturalism with different approaches to freedom and equality. 
Most democratic theories of multiculturalism prioritise equality over freedom (Walzer, 1983;
Phillips, 1999). They see diversity of cultures as an asset to society rather than a burden, and thus
all cultures deserve equal moral standing and protection. The emphasis is on “multi” first, and where
needed differentiation in rights and entitlements will be made in order to secure equality. Neo-
liberal theories of multiculturalism also see diversity of cultures as an asset to society but are less
clear on equality versus freedom (Kymlicka, 1989 and 1995). The moral value worthy of protec-
tion and standing is assigned to the individual person rather than to the cultural group and in most
theories of liberal multiculturalism differentiation is not acceptable (Sandel, 1982). One might say
that these emphasize neither “multi” nor “culture” by remaining neutral (Rawls, 1971; Nozick, 1974;
Dworkin, 1977). Finally, communitarian theories of multiculturalism value the cultural survival
of the group above all and thus appear willing to forego both equality and freedom (Taylor, 1989).
This emphasis on “culture” becomes problematic not only if a culture promotes illiberal practices
7 Connolly’s political model of democracy which promotes agonistic respect is called “agonistic democracy” meaning
a “practice that affirms the indispensability of identity to life, disturbs the dogmatization of identity, and folds care for
the protean diversity of human life into the strife of interdependence of identity/difference” (2002[1991]: x). The pol-
itics of identity/difference presupposes that all identities are contingent and only the acceptance of contingency can lead
to an ethos of democracy where one becomes alert to new dimensions of ethical concern in the relations of identity to
difference (Connolly, 2002[1991]: 121). The model thus opens political spaces for adversarial relations of agonistic
respect. It does not exhaust these spaces but leaves room for other modalities of attachment and detachment. As such,
it disrupts consensual ideals of political engagement and aspirations by insisting on cultivating agonistic respect be-
tween interlocking and contending constituencies. In other words, it seeks to overcome the us-them syndrome but hold
on to the identity/difference reality by pursuing a pathos of distance through an ethics of agonistic respect. 
8 Democratization through integration requires that integration institutions have legitimacy. These must be designed in
such a way that they foster a sense of collective reasoning, meaning some involvement of all groups in society and where
feasible joint decision-making on major issues. Numerous models have been designed espousing varied degrees of col-
lective reasoning in divided societies (Rawls, 1971; Lijphart, 1977; Dryzek, 1990; Connolly, 2002 [1991]; Habermas,
1992; Tully, 1995; Phillips, 1995; Keating, 2001; Goodin, 2003; Bader, 2007; Norval, 2007).
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which might oppress individual members but also if it is unable to be inclusive in terms of ex-
tending membership to new members except through assimilation. This muddled state of affairs
in theories of multiculturalism is not just an academic debate about ideals of freedom, equality
and culture, or which multiculturalism-as-ideology do we value. It is about how to conceptualize
social integration strategies based on status. Political institutions of diversity management are thus
the mechanisms by which to promote not only equality and freedom but also to organize peace-
fully and democratically societies in terms of multiculturalism. The democratic model that is cho-
sen is therefore a key to the design of the policies which must sustain the model.7
A cultural diversity management scheme is the practical implementation of social integra-
tion policies. Usually social integration strategies are a response to change. Change touches all
members of society. Programmes to enhance social integration are thus both functional tools for
fostering social cohesion and ideological ideals for social unity. Moreover, they involve both peo-
ple and institutions, and they must involve both the public and the private spheres. Most impor-
tantly, they must include law and morality because their overall aim is to create social order as
well as social unity. Change happens furthermore not only within societies but also in the wider
context of the global society. Global phenomena influence the way in which states adapt both in-
ternally and externally. Social integration strategies must adapt to change both within and with-
out. In several ways, social integration is a two-way process. Social integration strategies are
therefore political tools of democratization.8
For a cultural diversity management scheme to be normative it must ideally consist of sev-
eral components that in a concerted effort aim at social cohesion. As a minimum such a scheme
should include a social integration strategy, an inter-cultural dialogue strategy, cultural parity
among groups, substantive equality, participation at all levels and in all sectors, mainstreaming,
data collection aggregated according to ethnicity, cultural indicators, monitoring and review.
Specifically with regard to a social integration strategy, this should for a starter have a statement
on social cohesion. Often this is neglected by governments because they feel that referring to
constitutions and other legal statutes will fill this need. These are important too. But a robust
statement on social cohesion will force governments to deal with the notion of culture. Law does
not usually deal with culture. Hence it is not enough to refer to human rights, civil rights, the rule
of law and democratization. The political aim has to guide the strategy, and once laid out clearly
in the strategy, it will more likely be included in the policies. 
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Conclusions
Coping with cultural contestations is thus a complicated matter in any diverse society. No
matter how equitable a cultural diversity management scheme, and based on a sound social co-
hesion model, it does not alone bring about integration and unity in deeply divided societies. It
is apparent in many of such societies that the lack of ethical behaviour is hampering achieving
satisfactory results. Ethical behaviour is difficult to foster and certainly extremely difficult to de-
fine. Ethical behaviour is closely related to identity and the relation between one’s own identity
and that of others. The problem is that to act ethically is often to call some comforts of identity
into question. To be ethical is often to put identity at risk. Hence, to be ethical one has to go be-
yond toleration and show respect. In doing so one enters the space of the intertwining between
identity and difference. The implication is that a reassessment of one’s true identity may be re-
quired. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss identity in relation to difference. Suffice to
notice, that because many equate the demands of morality with the identity they already confess,
to ensure ethical behaviour in integration processes, identity has to be de-essentialized through
the incorporation of contingency rather than the negation of difference.
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“Old” and “New” Minorities: 
The Pro and Contra of Similar Treatment
Yves Plasseraud*
In international circles dealing with minority issues (International Organisations9 and
NGOs10), one of the new questions of discussion is the necessity (and feasibility) of assimilating
the notion of traditional national minorities (autochtonous minorities) with the new groups cre-
ated by “recent” immigration (“new minorities”). Such an assimilation would have direct impact
on issues of protection accorded by governments and international agreements to both groups.
To take familiar examples, in a country like Sweden, should the Morrocans be treated the same way
as the Finns or the Sami? The practical issue behind this question is the nature of the cultural,
linguistic and other rights conferred by the states on the two groups. The question is indeed a
complex one. 
The first difficulty stems from the fact that – until recently – for various reasons, the inter-
national organisations have not been able to agree on a common definition of the concept of mi-
nority. A kind of “soft” consensus nevertheless existed in Europe. A minority was considered to be 
“A group of citizens of a State, constitutiong a numerical minority and in a non-dominant
position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ
from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, mo-
tivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with
the majority in fact and in law.” (Deschênes, 1985)
A second difficulty stems from the fact that among the members of the “new minorities”
some are citizens of their new home country and are in the process of integration, while some
others (because they are newcomers or for other reasons) are neither citizens nor assimilated. 
In the latter years, the traditional approach to the concept of minority has been challenged
by some countries and experts who propose dropping the citizenship requirement from the list of
criteria defining a minority. Owing to the intensity of the claims of the parties and to the number
of individuals concerned (tens of millions), this is far from being a minor issue. The purpose of
the present paper is to cast some light on this controversial issue.
11 According to international norms, aliens, refugees, permanent residents, migrant workers and stateless persons are
counted as non-citizens.
12 The “Russians” who are citizens of Latvia (a group of growing significance) are on the other hand fully entitled to 
enjoy the minority cultural rights provided for by the Constitution (Satversme) and by the special Act on minorities
(March 19, 1991). 
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The Lessons of Experience
What is the Scope of the Notion of Minority?
The case of Latvia is a good example. When examining the question of the nature of a
community in order to determine whether it can be qualified as a national minority, many criteria
are usually taken into consideration. Among those, several appear essential:
– Objective (sizewise) situation of minority: this criterion is obviously fulfilled in the case of
the Russians in Latvia.
– Sufficiently different identity from that of the dominant population: no doubt that the
Latvian Russians have a different culture from that of the Latvians. The same observation can –
to some extent – be made about the Alsacians or the Kabyles in France and the Turks or the
Sorben in Germany.
– Subjective conviction on behalf of the members of the concerned group of belonging to a
minority and of wanting the group to survive (self-identification). This attitude generally goes
together with a sense of solidarity on the part of the members of the relevant group. There is no
doubt that this is the case here concerning all minority groups of Latvia. The same would be true
in the West for groups like the Scots in the UK or the Valdotains in Italy.
– Duration of the presence in the relevant territory: it is usually the principal criteria taken
into consideration in “Old Europe”. Owing to their historical presence on the French territory, the
Armenians are seen as a “real” minority in France while the Sri Lankans, as new arrivals, are not.
We have seen that concerning the Russians of Latvia, the situation is ambiguous.
– Non-dominant position: in this respect, in South Africa under the apartheid the Whites
were not considered a minority. This point of view is however not absolutely general and, for
instance, the Council of Europe PACE Recommendation 1201 does not mention this criterion. 
In Latvia, the length of the period of presence on the national soil is not officially taken into
consideration except de facto for those of the “Russians” who were present on the territory of the
Republic of Latvia, prior to the first Soviet annexation of June 17 1940.
– The question of citizenship.11 This is indeed THE issue in Latvia, as well as in other post-
Soviet states. To be considered as belonging to a minority (i.e to be able to enjoy the relevant
rights), a member of a differenciated group in Latvia has to possess the relevant state
citizenship.12 Although as we have seen, this does not contradict the traditional European norm,
the highlighting of this unique criteria is not frequent in Europe as a whole and usually exists in
states where it is least possible for non-EU citizens to acquire citizenship. 
13 Roberta Medda-Windischer, Old and new minorities: Reconciling diversity and cohesion, A human Rights Model
for minority integration. Bolzano/Bozen, Nomos, 2009, p. 63.
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All Minorities have Common Characteristics and Claims
Latvia is home to a number of traditional (old) minority groups. Among these populations a
tiny group, the Liivs are the most ancient. One can also cite the Roma, the Belorussians and
Poles as well as a number of other small groups. Basically these groups, whether comparatively
large (ethnic Russian citizens of Latvia) or minute (Liivs), share a certain number of elements 
of identity and claims with the representatives of the “new” minorities. These elements are
essentially:
– the fact of being a numerical minority,
– a distinct cultural identity,
– the feeling of being in a position of minority,
– the duration of the presence of the group in the relevant country (100 years or 3 genera -
tions),
– a non-dominant position in the relevant state.
Taking these elements into consideration, one author, favourable to the assimilation of the
two groups13 proposes the following inclusive definition of minorities in general:
“A minority is a group of persons, (1) resident within a sovereign state on a temporary 
or permanent basis, (2) smaller in number than the rest of the population of that state or of a
region of that state, (3) whose members share common characteristics of an ethnic, cultural,
religious or linguistic nature that distinguish them from the rest of the population and (4) mani-
 fest, even implicitly, the desire to be treated as a distinct group.” 
Such a definition, omitting the citizenship requirement and thus encompassing both histor-
ical and new minorities, is supposed to benefit the immigrant groups (by bestowing on them a
new series of rights) while not being detrimental to the “native” minorities.  
New and Old Minorities Also Have Different Charasteristics 
and Articulate Diverging Requests
As seen above, the main claim of the “new” Russian minority in Latvia is accepting all
permanent residents of Latvia as equal members of society and full integration (while keeping alive
their language and culture) in the country. Except for the traditionally discriminated group of the
Roma, this preoccupation is not shared by other minority groups who are de facto rather well
integrated and who are (like the national minorities in the West) on the contrary asking for an
efficient possibiliy to keep and sustain their historic specificity.
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In most European countries, the migrant groups do not object to the requirement that they
must speak the official language of the host country. Nobody among the émigrés in France or
Gastarbeiter in Germany objects seriously to the obligation to learn the country’s language. In
Latvia and Estonia, it is different and many (mostly elderly) Russians still refuse to learn Latvian
or Estonian. Along the same line, another request initially frequently articulated by the repre -
sentatives of the Russian group was to see their language enjoy equal status with Latvian in
public life. Considering that widespread use of Russian in Latvia is a relatively new phenomenon
from the Soviet era, and Russian language is also associated with occupation in the Latvian
political imagination, this request was rejected. 
In most countries of Europe, old minorities resist assimilation with more energy than new
ones whose members – having chosen to emigrate – are more willing to assimilate. In Latvia, it
seems to be the opposite, the national minorities appear to be progressively dying out by
assimilation while the Russian-speakers tend on the contrary to support their language and
customs with more energy and determination. The reason is apparently the numerical weakness
of the traditional minority groups as opposed to the size of the Russian community and its support
by Moscow. 
If we now take a look at the European situation in general we see that among the
discrepancies between the two types of minorities, one must also mention that national minorities
claim (and sometime enjoy) a set of rights which are not available to immigrant communities.
Among these rights one can cite the right to territorial autonomy on a land historically connected
with the people in question (ex: Euskadi, Wales, Val d’Aoste) or the possibility to follow particular
ways of managing land or natural resources.
On the other hand, new minorities’ claims are usually articulated around the following points:
– the quest for non-discrimination, 
– the possibility to enjoy full citizenship rights (equality),
– the right to effective participation of the community in public life of their country of
residence.
One can sum up the situation by saying that old minorities are looking for a form of
particularism while their new conterparts are aspiring to equality and dignity. If we consider that
minority rights are an important part of human rights and have to be efficiently applied whenever
appropriate, a solution must be found to the question of to whom the corpus of minority rights
should apply. 
In Search of a Reasonable Solution
What we have seen above shows that new and old minorities actually share a number of
common chacteristics which derive from their minority status on the one hand and from the
requirements of the basic corpus of human rights on the other (non-discrimination, equal
opportunity, cultural rights). The temptation to assimilate the two is thus a normal reaction,
particularly in view of the well known fact that unity makes strength. However, it appears that
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these rights would be largely inappropriate in the case of new minorities and this for the follow-
ing reasons.
The old minority groups and the majority in the same countries in Europe have usually
belonged to the same cultural area and their habitus was not very far apart from that of the titular
inhabitants of the country and did not “hurt” the sensitivities of the majority. This is not necessarily
the case with the new minorities whose traditions and religions can be very different (in Western
Europe the majority of migrants are no longer Europeans). The claims to maintaining distinct
cultural practices presented by the immigrants, sometimes extremely shocking for the “locals”,
might quickly discredit all minority rights including those of the traditional groups. Not to mention
that some traditional cultural and/or religious practices of extra-European groups (wearing
“chador”, female genital mutilation, polygamy, among others) would open the gate to endless and
probably counterproductive debates about the principles upheld by legal norms. 
The fact that a large proportion of the new minorities’ members, often originating from non-
democratic countries, lag behind the titular population in the civic field might create problems 
for continuing to uphold a set of rules established for a more civic-rooted and democratic
population.
The geopolitical context and the extreme violence of some extra-European “minority political
organisations” (Sri Lanka Tamil Tigres, Hamas) would immediately be used by opponents of the
minority cause (those are numerous in Europe, from nationalists to centralists-sovereignists of all
natures) to discredit and disenfranchise minorities in general. Some will object that the Basque
(ETA), the Corsicans (FLNC) and the Irish (IRA) ultra-nationalists have already done that efficiently
themselves. Nevertheless, experience shows that public opinion is more easily mobilised against
newcomers from non-European countries, and this may be a major factor explaining why terrorism
is associated in the public mind primarily with non-European groups, even though European
terrorist organisations have existed and sometimes still exist.
Granting the new minorities the same type of community rights that the autochtonous groups
claim and sometimes have obtained for themselves has already been partly experienced in some
countries under the name of “Identity politics” (Canada, United Kingdom). This “cultural ism” has
been found rather counter-productive inasmuch as it hinders the integration process which is the
basis of a stable state and is generally looked for by the majority of the members of the group.
Furthermore, it tends to isolate the members of the community in a sort of ethnic ghetto which –
in the long run – favours the ripening of extremist feelings (ultra-nationalism, xenophobia) and the
emergence of self-proclaimed leaders who abuse the credulity of their “compatriots”. The Hamas
is the product of such a process in the refugee camps of Jordan, Lebanon and Gaza.  
It would be thus probably be wiser to adopt a more nuancée approach. Such a policy –
which is often referred to as “tolerance policy” – could be based on the two following observations:
The majority of the residents of current western countries, suffering from a “democracy
deficit” are, above all, looking for equality of rights and dignity,
In our modern world, the ethnic or national group has been recognized by sociologists and
political scientists alike as constituting a natural mediator between the individual and society.
14 With some variations these solutions are currently advocated by liberal-communautarian thinkers such as Charles
Taylor, Michel Wierviorka or Denis Lacorne.
15 The CoE Framework Convention on national minorities is the most well known internal instrument but there are many
others.
16 Yves Plasseraud, L’identité, LGDJ, Montchrétien, coll. Clés, 2003.
Acknowledging that all minorities share a number of essential common characteristics and
claims, a realistic solution could for instance be of the following type.14
1. Establish a general minority rights “platform” including both the ancient negative (don’t)
and the more recent positive (do) provisions such as equal treatment and non-discrimination on
the one hand, recognition of particular identity, right (and actual possibility) to create minority
organizations, freedom to exchange with kin people in neighbouring states, to vote at local
elections, to enjoy cultural and language rights, original name spelling possibilities, etc, on the
other hand.
2. At the same time, maintain and improve the existing set of measures which exclusively
concern national minorities and which have have proved helpful for quite a few years in a number
of countries.15 Among these elements those concerning autonomy, both territorial (Aland Islands,
Crimea, Corsica, Sicily, Scotland) and extra-territorial, i.e cultural (Estonia, Hungary, Russia) and
the right to maintain an original way of life are obviously central.
3. Create a set of specific rights adapted to the real requirements of the immigrant
communities. Among these rights, one could for instance include: 
– information about the political and social structures, 
– specific help to integration such as language courses (national and possibly regional 
(ex: Catalan) language, 
– introduction to the language and culture of the land of origin of the migrants, etc.
Conclusion 
Considering that, as recognized by UNESCO, minorities are an essential asset for the world,
it is justified to grant all minorities a sufficient degree of protection/promotion, but it also appears
wise to treat new minorities and old ones in different manners. In effect, if – as seen above – pro-
moting the rights of new minorities too much might prove dangerous or detrimental for the civic
peace of the concerned countries, supporting old ones presents fewer inconveniences and might
on the contrary be a good idea for the future of same countries. Indeed, for societies as for nature
in general, diversity is now fully recognized as essential for adaptability and thus for survival.16
As in the case of animal or vegetal species, every culture which dies represents a world of pos-
sibilities and freedoms which disappear. We must remember that our differences are our common
treasure and that saving them is for each of us a moral responsibility.
* Dr. Zhidas Daskalovski is a senior analyst at the Center for Research and Policy Making (www.crpm.org.mk) and
assistant professor of political science at the Department of Public Administration (FAMIS) at the University of Kli-
ment Ohridski in Bitola.
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The Macedonian Integration Model:
Minorities and Affirmative Action Policies
Zhidas Daskalovski*
Introduction
A former constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Macedo -
nia declared its independence on November 21st, 1991. In contrast to other former Yugoslav 
republics it enjoyed a peaceful and broadly uncontested transition to independence. Full inter-
national recognition was delayed by Greek objections to the new state being called Macedonia
and admission to the United Nations was blocked until April 1993, when it took place under the
interim designation “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. 
During the 1990s Macedonian political elites clashed with their ethnic Albanian counterparts
over the basic idea behind the concept of the state. Much of the tensions resulted due to the dif-
ferent perceptions among the two communities about the underlying concept of the Macedonian
state. In the early 1990s both Macedonians and Macedonian Albanians had ambiguous feelings
towards the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. Macedonians were satisfied with having secured
independent statehood. On the other hand, they realized that the Macedonian state was to face
many obstacles from the more powerful neighbours. Since throughout history Macedonia’s neigh-
bours have often denied the existence of a Macedonian nation, and claimed Macedonia and the
Macedonians as their own, membership in Tito’s Yugoslavia provided Macedonians with a “sense
of security, a sense of security both against unfriendly, even antagonistic states – Bulgaria, Greece,
and to a certain extent Albania and against a condescending and patronizing partner and neigh-
bour inside Yugoslavia, namely Serbia” (Rossos, 2002, 104).
Similarly, for the Macedonian Albanians independence from Yugoslavia was both a blessing
and a curse. On the one hand, with the dissolution of federal Yugoslavia and the proclamation of
the Macedonian independence Albanians from Macedonia escaped the destiny of their Kosovo kin
suffering under the strict rule of Slobodan Milosevic. Within the fledgling political system of the
Macedonian Republic they could influence domestic politics to a certain extent. At least in theory
Macedonian Albanians were guaranteed all civil, political and social rights. On the other hand,
however, Macedonian Albanians regarded the independence of the country and the new Macedo-
nian-Serbian border as an unnatural and burdensome obstacle to their relations with Kosovo 
Albanians. Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia perceive Kosovo Albanians as sharing the same 
17 See for example Gilles De Rapper, Crisis in Kosovo: Reactions in Albania and Macedonia at the Local Level, Ethno -
barometer Programme Working Paper No. 3, Rome: CSS/CEMES, 1998.
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identity.17 In fact, during Tito’s times Pristina was a regional centre for all Albanians in former 
Yugo slavia including those from Macedonia. Pristina University educated the political and social
elites of the Macedonian Albanians. For example, Arben Xhaferi, the leader of the Democratic
Party of the Albanians (DPA) was educated in Pristina and for some 15 years was director of the
province’s TV station.
Although separated from their Kosovo kin, Macedonian Albanians have a perception that
they are not a minority in the country. On the contrary they see themselves as equal partners to
Macedonians and have ever since the late 1980s asked for an equal legal status. When in 1989
a new constitution was adopted, defining the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as “the national
state of the Macedonian nation” rather than “the state of the Macedonian people and the Alba nian
and the Turkish minorities” as it had stood before, Macedonian Albanians vehemently protested.
When a similar formula was accepted in the Preamble to the 1991 Constitution, Albanian politi -
cal elites again protested against these developments and demanded that the Albanian com -
munity living in Macedonia had to be given a partner-nation status. 
Moreover, “the demographic superiority of the Albanians over the other ethnic minorities liv-
ing in Macedonia is the main argument in their struggle to improve the status of the Albanian com-
munity” (Aydin, 2000, 83). Besides, ethnic Albanians present a significant percentage of the
population in the areas they inhabit in Macedonia. Moreover, many Macedonian Albanians are
claimed to be without citizenship although they have lived in the country for years if not decades,
while also a number of ethnic Albanians from Macedonia have emigrated to Western Europe but
keep a close contact with their places of origin. Treated as a “mere minority ethnic group” Macedo -
nian Albanians perceived the new state and its institutions as lacking legitimacy. 
On the other hand, throughout the post-independence period Macedonians felt themselves
endangered and believed that granting partner-nation status to the Albanians would lead to a
Bosnia-type situation. Before the Ohrid Framework Agreement, signed on August 13, 2001,
Macedonians largely regarded the Republic of Macedonia as their nation-state, in which other eth-
nic groups are granted equal citizen rights. Macedonian political elites often argued that the mi-
nority rights for the ethnic Albanians in the country were on par with the highest standards of
international legislation. Of special concern to them was the fact that the percentage of the 
Albanian population in the country has significantly increased in the preceding decades. Before
the conflict in 2001 Macedonians often pointed out that as a result of the very high birth rate of
Macedonian Albanians and the migration of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo in the period between
1953 and 1993, the number of the Albanians had risen by 288,670 or 189.2% so that in 1994,
the percentage of the Albanians was 22.6% of the total population in Macedonia, compared to
1953 when this percentage was only 11.7%. 
Partitioned during the Balkan Wars in 1912/13 Macedonians were faced with harsh as-
similative practices. Assimilation policies continue even today in Greece and Bulgaria. Macedo-
nians in these countries have been assimilated in great numbers. Macedonians in the Republic
of Macedonia have thus felt doubly threatened; not only their presence in the historic region of
Macedonia is rapidly dwindling but also, now that there exists a free Macedonian state, ethnic
18 See, for example, the reports by the International Crisis Group. 1999. Towards Destabilisation? ICG Balkans Reports
No. 67 (May 1999), Skopje/Brussels, and Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, ICG Balkans Reports 
No. 98 (August 2000), as well as Farimah Daftary (2001a), “Testing Macedonia”. ECMI Brief # 4. European Centre
for Minority Issues, Flensburg, and (2001b), “Conflict resolution in FYR Macedonia: Power-sharing or the ‘civic ap-
proach’”. Helsinki Monitor, No. 4.
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Albanians were perceived to overtake it both demographically and politically. By and large, rather
than anti cipating sustainable peace or coexistence, “Macedonians remain mistrustful of the Alba -
nians” true intentions... at worst they suspect designs for a “greater Albania” or, more commonly,
“greater Kosovo” (Eran, 2003, 403). 
While Macedonians have kept insisting on a unitary nation-state Macedonian Albanians have
refused to be considered an ethnic minority in a Macedonian nation-state and have advocated for
official bi-nationalism. Although Macedonia recognized the rights of national minorities and pro-
moted pluralism in the media, native-language education, minority civil society organisations,
and interethnic power sharing in the national government, living standards sank as unemployment
soared. Under such circumstances the political transformation was formulated as a zero-sum
game, pitting ethnic Albanian grievances against Macedonian fears for “their” country’s security
and integrity.
Indeed, the founding of the new state in 1991 were not fully supported by the Macedonian
Albanians. Paradoxically, Macedonian Albanian politicians were, on the one hand, content with
the changes of the system and took an active part in shaping it. Ethnic Albanian legal experts were
involved in the drafting of the new Macedonian constitution. Three ministers of the short-lived
(March 1991 – June 1992) non-partisan, “cabinet of experts” were chosen among the ranks 
of this minority. The 1992 coalition government led by Branko Crvenkovski’s Social Democratic
Alliance (SDSM) as well as all the other cabinets since included one ethnic Albanian party with
five ministerial posts. Throughout the years Macedonian Albanians took increasing number of
posts in the diplomatic service, public administration, the police and the army. Nonetheless, ethnic
Albanian politicians in Macedonia “in the early years of transition, adopted an obstructionist 
tactic” (Hislope, 2003, 139). 
Thus, the new constitution did not pass an important internal test as it was not approved of
by the political parties of Macedonian Albanians. The special parliamentary session was boy-
cotted by the PDP-NDP (Party for Democratic Prosperity – National Democratic Party) to protest
the preamble of the constitution which formally declared Macedonia to be “the national state 
of the Macedonian people, providing for the full equality of citizens and permanent coexistence
of the Macedonian people with Albanians, Turks, Roma, and other nationalities.” As elaborated
earlier under the socialist constitution, the preamble defined Macedonia to be a nation of “the
Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities” and in 1991 Macedonian Alba -
nians felt that they had been demoted as they were not explicitly mentioned as a constitutive na-
tion along Macedonians.
During the 1990s the Macedonian political elites clashed with their ethnic Albanian counter -
parts over the basic idea behind the concept of the state. Various elements in the constitution,
the census taking, the laws on education, local self-government, and public display of national
minority symbols, the ethnic make-up of the police, army, as well as the public administration,
were all contested by Macedonian Albanians in this period.18 These are all constituent parts of
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the idea behind the Macedonian republic, the fundamentals which in all liberal states are ac-
cepted by the general public or at least by the principal sectors within. 
Starting with the early 1990s, reforms were enacted and improvements were made, albeit
slowly, resulting in a rise in participation of Macedonian Albanians in civic life in recent years. Simi -
larly, in 2000 amendments to the Law on Higher Education were passed allowing private edu-
cation in languages other than Macedonian, while a European-financed trilingual (Albanian, Eng-
lish, and Macedonian) university was opened in 2001. However, these changes have not been
sufficient for the political parties of the Albanians in Macedonia. Amid economic difficulties,
armed conflict erupted between Albanian rebels and government forces in 2001 but was quickly
ended through an EU- and US-mediated agreement, signed in August of that year. 
With a major segment of the population challenging the very foundations of the state, Macedo -
nia, before the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement and the subsequent adoption of the amend-
ments to the 1991 constitution could not consolidate its democracy. The main goal of the Ohrid
Agreement has been to accommodate the grievances of the Albanian community, while at the
same time preserving the unitary character of the state thus addressing the concerns of the Macedo -
nian majority who feared a “federalisation” of the country and its eventual disintegration. The ac-
cord envisioned a series of political and constitutional reforms designed to address ethnic 
Albanian demands for equal standing. Consequently, the amendments to the 1991 constitution
based on this agreement gave clear picture to the rights of national minorities and especially eth-
nic Albanians. On a symbolic level, a significant step forward was made when in November 2001
the changes to the constitution were voted by the political representatives of Macedonian 
Albanians. The founding legal document of Macedonia is now legitimized in the eyes of ethnic
Albanians.
The major provisions include fulfilment of much of the demands raised by the Macedonian
Albanians throughout the 1990s. The settlement introduced some features of power sharing,
such as a system of double majorities requiring consent from minorities represented in parliament
to key decisions of the Parliament, a substantial degree of municipal decentralization, equitable
representation in the public administration of the non-majority communities, as well as confi-
dence-building measures to overcome the immediate consequences of the 2001 conflict.
The implementation of the Ohrid Agreement has sufficiently stabilized the country so that
citizens recognize the legitimacy of national authorities and the laws that govern them. A key
concern addressed in the Ohrid Agreement has been the under-representation of Macedonian 
Albanians in the public administration (and public enterprises). The agreement established the
principle of achieving equitable and just representation in the public administration at the national
and local level as the highest priority, a key reform in the public sector. Before Ohrid accords
were implemented the members of the non-majority groups and especially the Albanians from
Macedonia, were underrepresented in the public sector. In particular, in sensitive areas of public
administration, such as the police, the number of Albanians had been low throughout the 1990s.
According to available data, Albanians only filled some 7 percent of positions in the public, mixed
and cooperative employment sector.
The programme has been quite successful in raising the number of minority members in the
public service. In a number of ministries like the ministries of Education, Economy, Health Care,
Defense, and Local Government, the percentage of ethnic Albanian employees corresponds to
19 See the data in the EU Progress Report on Macedonia published on 14th October, 2009, available at 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/olacrf/20091014Elarg/MK_Rapport_to_press_13_10.pdf p. 21.
20 See the data in the text published by Vest on 11th September, available at http://www.vest.com.mk/?ItemID=
B15E04094119F84584B9F44C4199CAF6
21 See Dnevnik 12th September, 2009, “Нема криза за рамковните вработувања [No crisis for “Ohrid Framework” 
employment]” available at http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/?itemID=01298A7CC1273F49879EAF325895C78C&arc=1
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the share of this population in the country in the census figures. Six of the 15 members of the
Judicial Council and one of the six elected members of the Council of Public Prosecutors belong
to non-majority communities. By 2009 there has been steady progress in implementing the pro-
visions of the Ohrid Agreement, in particular concerning the implementation of the decentraliza-
tion process, the use of minority languages, and equitable representation. In 2009, the Law on
Languages, which provides for greater use of a non-majority language spoken by more than 20%
of the citizens, i.e., Albanian, has begun to be implemented in parliament. The law extends the
provision on the use of language to the local offices of the State authorities and clarifies that non-
majority languages may not be used in the police and the army. Since there is 20% threshold,
the provisions at national level apply only to the Albanian language. The OSCE High Commissioner
for National Minorities stated that the law provides a clear and coherent legal framework and
meets international standards. 
Furthermore, in 2008, a law on the parliament’s committee on inter-community relations
was enacted stipulating the scope of application of the double majority rule concerning laws im-
pacting on ethnic relations by listing all planned laws whose enactment should proceed accord-
ing to this principle. A law on the advancement and protection of the rights of the smaller
com munities was adopted which, in particular, provides for a specialized agency to be set up.
Committees for relations between ethnic groups (communities in Macedonia) have been set up
at local level in nearly all municipalities where they are required by law, as well as in some other
municipalities with sizeable minority populations but below the legal threshold of 20%. 
There has been further progress towards implementing the strategy for equitable represen-
tation of ethnic communities in the public sector. Thus, the number of civil servants from the non-
majority ethnic communities increased to 26% at central level by September 2009.19 In particular,
the numbers of minority civil servants employed within the Ministry of Interior have increased to
20.33%, a significant increase from 2000 when their numbers were at 8%.20 Further measures
for employment of minority members are envisioned by the Secretariat for the Implementation of
the Ohrid Agreement.21
Concluding Remarks Concerning 
the Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement: Equitable and Just 
Representation of Citizens
In accordance with the principle of equitable representation Macedonian authorities imple-
ment the concept of affirmative action generally referred to in international law as “special meas-
ures.” In the concluding section we shall theoretically discuss this concept and point to related
difficult areas that can affect the Macedonian democratic consolidation. In particular, we shall out-
line the potential limitations and dangers of the implementing of the provisions of the Ohrid
31
Framework Agreement for the Macedonian policy makers. While doing so, we shall restate 
the basic ideas concerning the need for equitable inter-ethnic relations and a special care of the
interests and the status of the minority population in a liberal-democratic society. 
Liberal nation-building has a significant impact on multiethnic states. Justice in ethnically
heterogeneous states requires that the state not be understood as an ethnic “nation-state”, a
state that belongs to the citizens of one ethnic group, but as a polity that is shared by all citizens
of the country. National minorities often ask for state assistance for those things that the major-
ity takes for granted. In a liberal polity, all persons should be treated equally and when the state 
sustains the life options of the individuals from the majority population through the process of 
nation-building, it must also maintain the life choices of the persons from the minorities if it is
going to treat all citizens equally. Moreover, a plural state is more legitimate if all its citizens and
not only those of the majority, consider the territory of the state their own homeland, accept the
legal system of the state and their institutions, and respect the insignia of the state as their own
symbols. These are goods to be jointly shared with all of the other citizens. The political com-
munity of a multicultural country will be just if
“it is formed from a union of ethnic groups living together. Its official symbols, holidays,
its cultural goods handed down in school, and its historical remembrance will absorb
something from the tradition of all the ethnic groups belonging to it, so that everyone
can see the state is also theirs: likewise, everyone can see that the state is not their ex-
clusive possession but is held jointly with the other ethnic groups forming it.” (Lis,
1996, 237) 
In principle, a liberal state should take into consideration the needs of persons belonging to
minorities that are for any given reasons seriously disadvantaged in comparison to the members
of the majority. Under such state of affairs, universalistic liberal policies aimed at eradicating in-
dividual deprivation might need to be modified. Liberalism is concerned about outcomes in which
people have fewer resources and opportunities than others when this is due to circumstances that
they had no responsibility for causing. Therefore, the need for special treatment of disadvantaged
minorities can be related to a situation where the process of nation-building has been undertaken
with no regard as to the interests of the members of the minorities and such a long period of time
that these individuals have been permanently excluded from the economic and social mainstream.
Special measures and political mechanisms for achieving just minority representation could be
employed in situations where a need arises for ameliorating systematic disadvantages. Under
such conditions, we should stress that granting special rights on temporary basis falls within the
liberal theory that emphasizes the equality of all its citizens. This is particularly cogent to re-
member when discussing the issue of “affirmative action.”
Systematically discriminated and thereby disadvantaged minorities, that have fewer re-
sources and opportunities than the majority population, such as African-Americans in the USA,
need(ed) special state assistance in overcoming this predicament and successfully integrating in
the society. Policies offering preferential admission to educational institutions and jobs to blacks
in the USA, Roma in Eastern Europe, Albanians in Macedonia, were/are consequently justifiable
exercises. Such treatment of American blacks “does no injustice to white males … since the 
former [they] have achieved their superior qualifications through the underserved advantages 
of past discrimination” (Ingram, 2000, 195).
22 See Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fifty-
second session, Item 3 of the provisional agenda, Comprehensive Examination of Thematic Issues Relating to Racial
Discrimination, The concept and practice of affirmative action, Preliminary report submitted by Mr. Marc Bossuyt, Spe-
cial Rapporteur, in accordance with Sub-Commission resolution 1998/5, p. 2.
23 A. Eide, Protection of minorities: possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of
problems involving minorities, (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34, para. 172) in: ibid, p. 19.
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In international law the concept of affirmative action is generally referred to as “special meas-
ures”. The first mention of these “special measures” was made by the Government of India dur-
ing the drafting of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
India suggested that an explanatory paragraph should be included in the text of article 2 speci-
fying that: “Special measures for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward sec-
tions of society shall not be construed as distinctions under this article. Alternatively, the
Committee might wish to insert in its report a statement, which would make that interpretation
clear.” Measures of that kind were essential for the achievement of true social equality in highly
heterogeneous societies.22
The important question for achieving social justice is how long to administer “affirmative 
action” without adjusting it to changeable circumstances. Affirmative action measures need not
be contrary to basic liberal principles. However, the demands by members of ethnocultural 
minorities for a form of an affirmative action are justifiable only if they are adopted in legal pro-
visions on a temporary basis. Once the effects of the long term oppression are mitigated, the pro-
visions for special measures would be redundant. After a certain period of implementation, the
inequalities vis-à-vis the privileged group of people would become ameliorated if not eradicated.
Thus, for example, “although it remains true that American blacks are on the average disadvan-
t aged, there is now a flourishing black middle class, and it is their children who are the main bene -
ficiaries of preferential admissions to the leading universities” (Barry, 2001, 115). One of the most
prominent experts in the field of multiculturalism Will Kymlicka speaks of the need for a tempo-
rary status of these group rights: 
“in so far as these rights are seen as a response to oppression or systematic disadvan-
tage, they are most plausibly seen as a temporary measure on the way to a society
where the need for special representation no longer exists … society should seek to re-
move the oppression and disadvantage, thereby eliminating the need for these rights.”
(Kimlicka, 1995, 65) 
Evidently, once the systematic disadvantage has been balanced out, the need for special
measures becomes obsolete. According to liberalism, “justice requires equal rights and opportu-
nities but not necessarily equal outcomes defined over groups” (Barry, 2001, 92). Therefore no
particular individual can proclaim that he/she has a right to a guaranteed post in the public ad-
ministration or in the state’s decision-making bodies. 
The requirement of “limited duration” of special measures has been continually stressed in
international law. In his report on protection of minorities, A. Eide offered affirmative action as a
solution to problems regarding minorities.23 However, he added that affirmative action can lead
to group conflict, for which reason such measures should not be continued beyond the time when
24 In its General Comment No. 18 on the non-discrimination principle, the Human Rights Committee stated that af-
firmative action, i.e. special measures, may be taken only for as long it is needed to correct discrimination in fact. On
the other hand, in paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 of its General Comment No. 23 on article 27, the minorities article, it ad-
mits that although the rights protected under article 27 are formulated in negativity terms positive measures by States
may also be necessary to protect the identity of a minority and so long as they are only aimed at providing protection,
they may constitute a legitimate differentiation under the Covenant. Here, no time limit is imposed. Notice also the dif-
ferent word use. This distinction is also made in State practice, for example, India has a different protection system
for minorities, whose rights have an element of permanence, and for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
whose special rights are envisaged as temporary and exceptional measures to reduce the inequalities between com-
munities. In: Preliminary report submitted by Mr. Marc Bossuyt, p. 28.
25 In: Preliminary report submitted by Marc Bossuyt, p. 19.
equality has been achieved.24 Prolonged implementation of affirmative action measures might be
problematic because it implies a unity of political attitudes based on arbitrarily given character-
istics such as race, ethnicity or culture. Granting special rights along ethnic lines might actually
homogenize the other ethnic communities, resulting in increasing of the level of interethnic mis-
trust and tensions. Therefore, affirmative action measures should be temporary and compensa-
tory, aimed at correcting conditions that impair the enjoyment of equal rights (Akermark, 1997,
23–8).25 Macedonian affirmative action policies should follow these recommendations.
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Social Inclusion: Was it Ever a Real Priority 
in Latvia’s Public Policy?
Feliciana Rajevska*
Soren Winter created a model to explain policy implementation outcomes by identifying
some of the key variables. In implementation studies it is not always clear what the dependent
variable is and there is little agreement about the proper standard of evaluation for purpose of de-
ciding whether the implementation was a success or a failure. Three main kinds of behavior can
be identified when we look for an evaluation standard: process, output and outcome/impact or
changes in society. This behaviour can then be compared either to the official (and/or the unof-
ficial) goals of the policy mandate to the problematic behaviour in the society to which one or
more policies address themselves or to the interests of the various actors who have a stake in the
implementation process. The additional obstacle for evaluating a programme is the factor, that
programme was not executed in isolation but in interaction with other policy programmes affect-
ing the same actors and target groups.
When implementation scholars explain why the objectives of a policy programme have not
been met, most studies have referred to failures during the implementation process. According
to Winter, the fact seems to be, that some policies are impossible to implement from the outset.26
He has derived a set of hypotheses about a linkage between policy formation and policy imple-
mentation. We would like to mention two of them. First hypothesis is that successful implemen-
tation is likely to be negatively related to the degree of conflict in the policy-formation phase.
Because con flictual policy formation tends to discourage any clear definition of goals while at the
same time new formal goals may be invented in order to legitimize compromises. Policy opponents
may be quite skilled in getting the implementation process structured in such a way that the 
policy is not implemented effectively. Second hypothesis is that an implementation success is
unlikely if the policy was adopted of purely symbolic reasons. Winter stressed that it is the case when
“demonstrating a willingness to act may be more important than actually solving problems.”27
This paper looks at the formulation, declared goals and reality of social (socio-economic) 
integration policy in Latvia as part of the larger Programme of Social Integration (which has in-
cluded, since 2001, aspects of ethnic, civic and socio-economic integration). 
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The first question of importance is how social integration arrived on the agenda. Was it grow-
ing from inside as a response to the needs articulated by civil society and political parties, or was
it enforced from outside by the EU, Council of Europe and OECD? In 1998, head of Latvian Gov-
ern ment, Guntars Krasts (Fatherland and Freedom) initiated the elaboration of this programme
as a solution to some acute problems in citizenship policy. In 1999 the debates in society took
place, broadening the programme, including social, regional and information aspects as part of
the larger bargaining and compromising game. The necessity to join EU and donor money has
stimulated the institutionalisation of this programme (as Integration Department in the Ministry
of Justice in the beginning and as Ministry of Integration in 2003–2008). Parties represented in
the ruling coalition were rather indifferent to the idea of integration.
There was no consensus in Parliament and ruling coalition concerning the support for the
idea of an Integration Programme. The Cabinet of Ministers did not accept responsibility for the
Programme. Rather, it was a shared responsibility of different ministries: Ministry of Welfare,
Ministry of Education, Ministry of Economy and since 2003 Ministry of Health, Ministry of Fam-
ily and Children’s Affairs and Ministry of Integration. The most consistent supporters of the inte-
gration idea among parties of the ruling coalition in the first decade of the twenty-first century were
Latvia’s Way and Latvia’s First Party, whose representatives were appointed to the position of the
Minister of Integration and to the Ministry of Family and Children’s Affairs in 2003–2008. Dur-
ing the expenditure cuts in 2008 both positions were abolished. 
Social inclusion policy has been declared as priority in different documents prepared and
signed by the Latvian government: Memorandum of Understanding between government of the
Republic of Latvia and European Commission on Latvia’s participation in the Community Action
programme to combat social exclusion (2002–2006); Joint Memorandum on Social Inclusion
prepared by Latvia together with European Commission (JIM) (signed on December 18, 2003);
Latvian National Action Plan for Reduction of Poverty and Social Exclusion (2004–2006) (accepted
on July 23, 2004); Informative Reports on implementation of Latvian National Action Plan for
Reduction of Poverty and Social Exclusion in 2004 and 2005 (annually by 1st July); National Re-
port on Strategy for Social Protection and Social Exclusion (2006–2008) (accepted on Septem-
ber 26, 2006); Monitoring Committee for Implementation of Latvian National Action Plan for
Reduction of Poverty and Social Exclusion (2004–2006) (approved on December 30, 2004);
Plan of Activities Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion (2008–2010).
The assessment of the situation in Latvia given in the Joint Inclusion Memorandum (De-
cember 2003) was very dramatic: “Even though the economic indicators are relatively high, the
increase in the level of public welfare is still too low”, “the increase in the income of inhabitants
is very uneven”, “the polarisation of material welfare is growing; there are a large number of per-
sons receiving a low income”, the low funding for health care raises particular concerns and is
insufficient in view of the present state of health and the material provision of the population”,
“the given indicator is among the lowest in Central and Eastern European countries.” On the
whole, GDP in Latvia has increased faster than the increase in resources allocated for social pro-
tection. The decrease in the proportion of resources allocated for social protection from GDP has
had a negative impact on the standard of living and state of health of the population. It also af-
fected the ability of the respective area institutions to perform their functions. Especially alarm-
ing was the assessment that concerned the health area: “Compared to the EU countries, the
general health condition of the Latvian population in terms of life expectancy and mortality indi-
cators is unsatisfactory.”
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Using the monetary poverty indicators approved at the Laeken European Council in 2001,
it is clear that Latvia has relatively high levels of income inequality and risk-of-poverty index.
Therefore Latvian government in the Joint Inclusion Memorandum (2003) declared, that “the re-
duction of poverty and social exclusion is one of the primary long-term social policy objectives in
Latvia. The main attention should be paid to efforts aimed at eliminating the causes of poverty
and social exclusion for various population groups. Besides implementing preventive measures,
it is necessary to identify targeted support measures for the most vulnerable groups.” However,
the success in poverty preventive measures was rather weak and very selective. There were some
improvements in family policy due to the introduction of generous maternity benefits. In the same
time, single elderly persons experienced rapid increase of the risk of poverty.
Table 1. The poverty risk index for households of various demographic groups, 
2005–2007 (%)
Household 2005 2006 2007
One-person household 41 55 59
One person aged 65+ 45 69 75
2 adults, 3 or more dependent children 39 52 46
2 adults, 2 dependent children 18 22 16
2 adults, 1 dependent child 14 15 12
Source: www.csb.lv
If we compare situation regarding inequality in the beginning of decade and in the end of it,
the results are very disappointing and alarming. The Gini coefficient indicating the inequality in
income distribution in Latvia reached 0.31 in 1999 (EU15 – 0.29) and is growing (see table 2).
Table 2. Dynamics of Gini Coefficient in Latvia
1996 1999 2002 2005 2007 2008
All households 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.38
Source: www.csb.lv
The ratio between the incomes of the top 20% of the income distribution and the bottom
20% was 5.1 in 1999 (EU15 – 4.6). The gap is still growing despite declared intentions (see
table 3). For comparison in 2007 the ratio was 4.8 in EU-27, 5.5 – in neighbour Estonia, 5.9 –
in neighbour Lithuania, 3.9 in rich Sweden and 3.5 in poor Bulgaria. 
Table 3. The ratio between the incomes of the top 20% of the income distribution 
and the bottom 20% in Latvia
1999 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008
5.1 5.5 6.7 7.9 6.3 7.3
28 The Handbook of European Welfare Systems Edited by Klaus Schubert, Simon Hegelich and Ursula Bazant, 2009,
Routledge, p. 158, 297, 329. 
29 Ibid.
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The year 2010 in EU has been announced as year of combating poverty and social exclu-
sion. In August 2009, the Government of Latvia wrote a letter to the European Commission stat-
ing that the country will not participate in this programme because it has no financial resources
for co-financing. 
A comparison of the dynamic of social expenditure per capita in all three Baltic countries and
EU-25 in 2000–2005 when active accession process to the EU and joining EU took place demon-
strated very reserved attitudes of the political elite in Latvia to the increase of social expenditures
in absolute figures. 
Table 4. GDP per capita (EUR) for social expenditure in absolute terms28
Year Latvia Lithuania Estonia EU-25
2000 541.7 558.9 623.4 5358.7
2001 559.4 574.1 664.2 5595.0
2002 577.5 609.6 724.6 5834.8
2003 586.3 646.0 807.8 5981.7
2004 624.5 701.4 932.8 6216.0
2005 700.4 802.1 1043.0 6441.9
Increase in +158.7 +243.2 +419.6 +1083.2
2000–2005
Table 5. The dynamic of social expenditure as % of GDP29
Year Latvia Lithuania Estonia EU-25
2000 15.3 15.8 14.0 26.6
2001 14.3 14.7 13.1 26.8
2002 13.9 14.1 12.7 27.1
2003 13.8 13.6 12.6 27.4
2004 12.9 13.3 13.1 27.3
2005 12.4 13.2 12.5 27.4
Changes in –2.9 –2.6 –1.5 +0.8
2000–2005
While social expenditures per capita in absolute figures have been the lowest among Baltic
States, the reduction in percent of GDP in Latvia following the economic downturn was the largest
one. In this connection it is easy to understand the mass out-migration from Latvia when labour
market became open.
Eurobarometer has done a survey on the perceived causes and reasons of poverty in 2007.
European Union citizens are more inclined to view injustice in society as the cause of poverty
(37%). One European in five feels that people live in need because of laziness and lack of
willpower (20%) and a similar proportion is of the view that bad luck is the cause of poverty
(19%). A small minority of Europeans finds that poverty is an inevitable part of progress (13%)
(p. 29). The highest accordance with the view that poverty is caused by injustice in society is
found in East Germany (65%) and Bulgaria (59%). This view is least videly supported in Den-
mark (17%), the Czech Republic (21%) and Malta (22%). The public opinion in Latvia in 2007
demonstrated equal share of those respondents who view laziness and lack of willpower as the
cause of poverty and those who consider injustice as the cause of poverty (36% in both cases). 
Financial and economic crisis has had very heavy consequences for the inhabitants of Latvia.
Eurobarometer Survey data in October 2009 demonstrated that 30% of the population in Latvia
had difficulty to make ends meet. Average figure of this group in EU-27 was only 12%, in Esto-
nia – 13% and in Lithuania – 18%. Such high proportion of risk group is a serious threat for 
social stability. 
In Latvia, social integration goals have been formulated in policy documents and the insti-
tutional framework for social integration policies has basically been established, but the political
process has not ensured an adequate reaction to public needs, and it does not deal with the in-
creasing social polarisation which is evident in society. We can conclude that social integration
and inclusion policy has never been a real policy priority in Latvia.
* Raivo Vetik is Professor of Comparative Politics at Tallinn University.
39
Coordinating of Integration Policies of Estonian Society
Raivo Vetik*
In 1997, a new government position – Population Affairs Minister without a portfolio – was
created in Estonia. The minister’s task was to coordinate policies related to the integration of
non-Estonians (mainly Estonian Russians) into the Estonian society. Since that time, every cabinet
has included a population minister and the position has been held by Andra Veidemann (1997–
1999), Katrin Saks (1999–2003), Eldar Efendijev (2003–2005), Paul-Erik Rummo (2005–2007),
and Urve Palo (2007–2009). On the 21st of May, 2009, in connection with the dissolution of
the coalition and the Social Democratic Party’s (SDP) move into the opposition’s ranks, the
standing population minister Urve Palo from the SDP was relieved of her duties. The coalition
decided to divide the responsibilities of the Population Affairs Minister among other ministries,
whereas the responsibility for coordinating integration policies was given to the Ministry of Culture. 
The objective of this article is to analyse the pros and cons of the 2009 integration policy
coordination reform and to formulate recommendations for the future. The analysis is based on
the comparison of different forms of policy coordination as outlined in public administration theory,
as well as on interviews with experts that were carried out between June and August in 2009.
The article is composed of three parts: first, the theoretical standpoints on the coordination of
horizontal policies; second, the expert evaluations of the 2009 reform in coordinating integration
policies; third, the conclusions and recommendations. 
Forms of coordination of horizontal policies 
in public administration theory
Policy making is often targeted towards issues that are wider in scope than the mandate of
any particular government institution. In those instances, it becomes necessary to make various
institutions work together to achieve a common objective, which presupposes the existence of a
coordinating unit. Effective coordination of horizontal policy areas is complicated, because
achieving harmony between different institutions is problematic not only due to organizational,
but also due to political, economic and other reasons. Consequently it is important to find a
suitable institutional form for each specific instance that would minimize the innate problems of
coordination. 
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Such a state of affairs requires the analysis of the main pros and cons of the coordinating
mechanisms used to date in the practice of public administration, which could be used as a
theoretical framework for specific instances. The objective of the first part of the article is to
present this kind of framework, based on a description of the most typical structural units that
coordinate policies, as well as a list of their strengths and weaknesses as presented by Guy Peters
(2005), one of the leading public administration theorists of the recent decades. Public
administration theory claims that policy coordination uses methods of the market, networks or
hierarchies. According to Peters, in policy coordination the hierarchical methods are most
prevalent and the central units are the head of government and the governing structures that are
directly connected to him or her – the cabinet and the central agencies. Peters lists the following
institutional forms as those used by the head of government and his central agencies: 
1) The head of government’s team
Since the head of government, as a rule, has little time to coordinate the activities of different
ministries, he/she can create teams to help him. The strengths of this form of managing cross-
cutting policies are flexibility and the absence of political discord, which ensures that the
decision-making process is fast. At the same time, this form is characterized by its high
centralization, which could prove to be a downside in certain situations. 
2) Central agencies
The central agencies are, for example, budget, policy and human resources departments
that are directly below the head of government. These agencies can be assigned the task of using
their managing instruments to implement the priorities of the head of government. Unfortunately
they often also develop their own priorities, which makes the decision-making process more
complicated. The weakness of this form lies in the possible conflicts between the central agencies
and their subordinate organizations that provide the public service. In order to be effective, the
central agency has to have the head of government’s full support. 
3) The government as a whole
In a sense, the government as a whole is the most logical institution to carry out these tasks,
because all participants in the policy making and service provision are represented there. At the
same time, the government is where ministers have to defend the interests of their own fields of
activities, which may not be considered as needing coordination when cooperating with other
institutions. Thus, such a form requires a strong head of government. 
4) Government committees
Often, the government is too big to coordinate a programme effectively. One possibility is to
create a committee of “priorities and planning” within the cabinet to cover this function. An
alternative is to create several government committees, each responsible for the policies of one
certain area. The benefit of this type of approach lies in the fact that it brings the various ministers
together to coordinate activities. However, if lines between different fields are blurred, it could lead
to excessive competitiveness. 
5) Ministers without a portfolio
A minister without a portfolio, who has been appointed to coordinate cross-cutting
programmes, has enough time to fill this function. At the same time, these kinds of ministers may
not have other necessary resources, because they lack the staff. Likewise, the minister without a
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portfolio, who lacks the support of a ministry, may not have sufficient influence among the
members of the cabinet. To eliminate this problem, this type of position should be filled with a
politician with strong political connections to the prime minister or an imposing personality. 
6) Additional portfolio for coordination
A minister in a certain field can be given a portfolio for the coordination of specific policies.
The system’s benefit is having a person responsible for coordination, however, it is unlikely that
the new field of coordination will get the same attention as the minister’s main activities. 
7) Junior ministers
Instead of assigning additional responsibilities to a minister, cabinets may choose to create
a system of junior ministers that helps coordinate ministries and is responsible for certain areas.
A junior minister encounters the same problems as a minister without a portfolio – with the title
“junior” they almost always have less power than ministers or even senior officials. 
8) Ministries
One possibility that has been implemented is the creation of “super ministries” that join a
large scope of programmes within their structures. Even though it seems logical to cover as many
similar tasks as possible under one ministry’s administrative umbrella, the results of coordination
with this method can be ostensible rather than real. First of all, this requires the existence of a
support structure of considerable size in the ministry. At the same time, if the minister has too
big a ministry with excessive internal units, he or she may be faced with the same problems that
the prime minister has with coordinating other ministers. A significant deficiency is also that
when the main coordinating responsibility is placed with the ministry, decisions are made by
career officials rather than political officials. Therefore, the large ministry model may support
certain ideas only, leaving many others without sufficient representation in the government. 
9) Advisory committees
One way to solve the coordination problems is to determine the common interests of
ministries. This can be done by forming advisory committees in the ministry that include
representatives from other relevant organizations who have a say in important political decisions.
One of the options of the advisory committee mechanism is using steering committees. The
representatives from different fields can express their interests and ideas there, which to a certain
extent leads to coordination without formal interference. 
10) Agencies with portfolios that deal with coordination
Ministries or agencies can be created to coordinate service provisions for a specific group of
people or a geographic location. These agencies defend the interests of that field or group inside
the government. The existence of these types of organizations does draw interest to an area, but
it does not guarantee the satisfaction of their policy needs to the full or necessary extent. These
ministries and agencies usually do not have a central role in the government and they may not
have much influence on the main actors, such as the large ministries of economic and social
affairs. 
11) Inter-ministerial groups
One option is to create temporary inter-ministerial operative groups or working groups.
Sometimes they are accorded executive power, but generally these units are geared towards
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identifying problems and finding out what are the central needs behind cross-cutting policies.
The second option is to create a “virtual unit” – one that does not have a fixed structure or staff.
The third option is to create inter-ministerial committees. Finally, for coordinating policies it is
also possible to create special organizations, whose task is to guarantee coordination in providing
clients with services. This kind of system forces government units offering services to consider how
to cooperate with other organizations with similar goals. At the same time, it is complicated for
these types of inter-ministerial groups to implement innovations. 
Expert evaluations of the coordination of integration policies 
in Estonia
When analysing the institutional forms of integration policy coordination in Estonia, it can
be said that so far types five and six of the options listed above have been used – until May 2009,
there was a minister without a portfolio and after May 2009, an additional portfolio for
coordinating integration policies was given to the Ministry of Culture. According to the April 12th,
2007, order of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia, entitled “Defining Minister Urve
Palo’s Tasks”, the functions of the Population Minister related to integration were the development
and implementation of an integration policy and the overseeing of citizenship policy implementa -
tion. Until May 2009, the Population Minister carried out her coordinating task mostly through
the steering committees of national programmes (Integration in the Estonian Society 2000–2007,
The Estonian Integration Programme 2008–2013) and the council of the Integration Foundation.
In carrying out her responsibilities, she had at her disposal the bureau of the minister without a
portfolio, created under the State Chancellery, that included permanent officials, technical
personnel and advisers appointed by the minister, i.e. a body of civil servants. As a structural unit
of the State Chancellery, the minister’s bureau was Integration Foundation’s counterpart in the
government, as well as the agency responsible for implementing the program mes of the European
Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals in Estonia. 
With the June 11th, 2009, order of the Government of the Republic of Estonia, the tasks of
the Population Minister were distributed among four ministries as follows: 1) in points 1 and 5
of the decision, the tasks related to population policies were given to the Ministry of Social Affairs;
2) points 2 and 3 listed the tasks related to integration policies that were given to the Ministry
of Culture; 3) the tasks listed in point 4 related to liaising with Estonians living outside of the
country were given to the Ministry of Education and Research; 4) tasks listed in point 6 related
to benefits for citizens who had suffered from Soviet repressions were given to the minister of
Regional Affairs. 
The tasks related to coordinating integration policies were thereby given to the Ministry of
Culture. The structure of this ministry includes the Department of Diversity, whose responsibility
is creating conditions for the development of the cultural life of minorities, their integration into
the Estonian society, with a deputy Chancellor responsible for the tasks. According to the statute,
the ministry supports the activities of the cultural societies of ethnic minorities, helping promote
their culture and activities. After the reform, the functions description of the department was
supplemented with the following sentence: the Ministry of Culture is also responsible for
integration policies, specifically for the general coordination of the integration activities of the
Estonian Integration Programme 2008–2013, for carrying out the implementation tasks of the
30 The interviews were conducted by Sirle Jääväli within the framework of her BA thesis “Coordinating the integration
process of the Estonian society”, where the author of the article was the thesis supervisor.
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European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals 2007–2013, and for supervising
the Integration Foundation. 
According to Guy Peters, the strength of the institution of a minister without a portfolio is that
there is a clearly defined person responsible, who focuses on one domain. The main deficiency,
however, is that the minister without a portfolio generally does not have enough resources to
carry out his or her function and usually does not have enough influence in the government either.
To minimize these deficiencies, the minister without a portfolio should have the prime minister’s
full support. In giving an existing minister an additional portfolio, the strength is that there is a
certain person who is responsible, whose position in the general system of management is strong
enough; however, there is the added danger that the newly added field will be left in the
background for him or her, since it is not a central issue for the ministry and the minister tends
to be occupied with many other activities. 
In this subsection of the article, we will describe the results of the interviews with experts,
with the aim of analysing how the strengths and weaknesses outlined in theory have carried over
into reality30. The interviews were semi-standardised, conducted between June and August of
2009. The interviewees were sent indicative questions and key words ahead of time, asking them
to compare the efficiency of the new and old systems, as well as the evaluation of the reasons
and consequences of the reform. The sample of interviewees comprised experts, officials and
politicians, who can currently be considered the most competent in appraising the integration
situation in Estonia: Mati Heidmets (professor, Department of Sociology, Tallinn University, board
member of the Integration Foundation council), Külli Vollmer (director of the public awareness unit
at the Integration Foundation), Eduard Odinets (director of the lifelong learning unit at the
Integration Foundation, adviser to the former Population Minister Katrin Saks, bureau manager
to the former Population Minister Urve Palo), Paul-Eerik Rummo (Member of Parliament since
2007, former Population Minister of the Republic of Estonia, 2003–2007), Anne-Ly Reimaa
(deputy Chancellor at the Ministry of Culture), Maie Soll (adviser in the Department of Language
at the Ministry of Education and Research), Katrin Saks (Member of the European Parliament
2006–2009; former Population Minister of the Republic of Estonia 1999–2002), Sergei Ivanov
(a politician from the Russian minority, former Member of Parliament 2003–2007), Eva-Maria
Asari (adviser to the former Population Minister Urve Palo in the field of integration policies).
When conducting the interviews, the focus was on the following issues: the coordination of
integration policies and responsibilities for this area under the old and new systems, the system
of political versus career officials, the importance of the topic of integration in the political system,
as well as for the general public in the old and new systems, and the reasons behind the
coordination reform. 
a. Political officials versus career officials
As a whole, the respondents were more positively disposed towards the former system,
compared to the current one. The main fault of the former system was considered to be the fact
that the officials of the Population Minister’s bureau were mainly political officials, that is when
the minister was replaced, so was the greater part of the officials. The main flaw of that kind of
system is the lack of consistency in policy making. 
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“I think that during the whole time when I was in the system, one of the biggest problems
was that the personnel changed too often, changed with each minister.” (Odinets, 2009)
“The problem has always been that the officials in the population minister’s bureau have
been the so-called “political advisers” and when a minister is replaced, they leave. There have been
instances, where it has taken quite a long time for new advisers to get adjusted and that means
that initiating activities, impact assessment is slightly slower during that time.” (Soll, 2009)
Another flaw in the previous system mentioned by the respondents was the small size of the
minister’s bureau. 
“The minister without a portfolio lacked the instruments to implement policies. Ministers
heading the ministries at the same time have a bigger and more influential support structure in
the form of a permanent and more numerous body of officials.” (Rummo, 2009)
At the same time, some respondents found that it could also entail certain benefits due to
the lack of bureaucratic obstacles, because the circle of approvals was smaller, making procedures
quicker and more streamlined. 
“He [the Population Minister] had such a small cabinet. But I think that they were relatively
hard working and professional. (...) I haven’t seen collaboration that good in a state institution
for a long time. (...) Things were done fast in the Population Minister’s bureau, things were done
within a week. (...) In that sense, I really liked communicating with the bureau, because it was
very flexible, fast, and I would say that was due to their small size, things were looked at very
fast, feedback came very fast, so the work was very effective.” (Vollmer, 2009)
The experts indicated their hope that a permanent apolitical body of officials will be formed
in the new system, to guarantee consistency in the field of integration when ministers change.
“Here the good thing is that the people who come to the ministry to work in integration,
became permanent officials. They learn and find out about everything and they do things and it
stays in that house, it stays with them. It’s not like before, when a new minister came, a new boss,
and everything was changed.” (Odinets, 2009)
“The new system should ensure the consistency of the field, of course, assuming that the
positions carried over from the bureau will be completely filled, since the employees of the Cultural
Diversity Department don’t have to leave when the minister is replaced.” (Asari, 2009)
b. The consolidation of coordination and responsibilities
The main message gleaned from the interviews was the concern of the people who know the
field over the quality of the coordination and the diffusion of responsibilities in the new system.
Formally the responsibility for integration has been given to the Ministry of Culture, however,
since the department of Cultural Diversity is just one part of the larger Ministry of Culture, it is
unclear how the coordination and responsibility will be handled in reality, how the oversight of
the domain as a whole will work and how collaboration with other ministries will be organized.
The respondents found that the new system lacks a connecting link between the multitude of
different actors that would guarantee systematic and holistic action. 
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“So many ministries that have to cooperate, such a large circle of people, institutions that
need to work together, coordinate the process. That requires some kind of separate structure, a
structure that is recognized at the state level.” (Odinets, 2009)
“None of the ministries deals with integration as a whole. They handle only their field, not
because they can’t see the broader picture, but because that’s what their functions are. A system
is needed, where someone is going to coordinate that [integration policy] and that should be a
sensible system… Other ministries just handle their own field, but integration policy has to be a
supra-ministerial phenomenon.” (Ivanov, 2009)
“The overall vision, I think, is fragmented.” (Vollmer, 2009)
“In the absence of a general coordinator, there’s the danger that integration as a horizontal,
cross-cutting topic will be too diffuse – it will become secondary in the administration activities
of the ministries and the oversight of funding as well as carrying out activities will become weak.”
(Asari, 2009)
“One thing that is still missing is the political responsibility over integration as a field.”
(Heidmets, 2009).
c. Emphasizing the importance of the field of integration in the political system and 
for the general public
According to the respondents’ assessment, the existence of a Population Minister ensured
that the problems of the field of integration were brought to the attention of the cabinet and
general public. In the new system, however, there is no person in the government for whom
integration would be priority number one. In a country like Estonia, where the topic of integration
has become more conflictual over recent years, a decision of the kind is highly questionable.
Likewise, it is inevitable that the ministries’ interests will stay focused on their own fields, since
their priorities have already formed and integration will remain a marginal issue for them. 
“This field needs policies. (...) This, in turn, requires policy makers and currently there are
none.” (Odinets, 2009)
“The funding could change, it will decrease anyway, due to the present situation, they will
not be able to carry out some of the planned activities, because the new leading ministry could
set new priorities. Integration policy could be then viewed only through the prism of cultural
differences, even though with this new programme it was agreed that a greater emphasis should
be on the socio-economic area and on activities that are geared towards reducing socio-economic
differences between different ethnic groups.” (Soll, 2009)
“The danger is that the integration policy will remain in the background and focus will be
shifted only to cultural activities – this would throw the whole action off balance. It is important
that integration policy should be pursued in the fields outlined in the Estonian Integration
Programme 2008–2013 – in educational, cultural, social, economic, legal, as well as political
fields.” (Asari, 2009)
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d. Causes of the reform
On the whole, the respondents found that the population minister as an institution ensured
the coordination of integration policy and the responsibility over carrying out the functions better
than the Ministry of Culture. The population minister was a link that connected different
institutions, thereby guaranteeing the integrity and consistency of the field. As a consequence of
the reform, the effectiveness of coordinating integration activities declined, as did the importance
of the topic in the cabinet as well as in the public eye. The respondents found that the reform
was carried out without sufficient analysis and that the decision was made more in consideration
of the interests of political parties than the general national interests. Even though the old system
also had its flaws, their elimination did not require demolishing the whole existing system. 
“I don’t think that the activities at the time needed reforming. Changes had been made all
the time, but I don’t think that fundamental changes were needed. I think eliminating that
[ministerial] position was not sensible. It seemed to me that the system that had functioned over
10 years had been broken in Estonia.” (Heidmets, 2009)
“The system needed change, it certainly did. But I think that not in the way it was done. My
vision would be different, not eliminating the whole bureau. If we wanted to maintain a certain
competence in the field, it should have been done differently.” (Odinets, 2009)
The formal explanation for eliminating the position of the population minister cited the need
for cutting budgetary expenditure. From the interviews, it became apparent that the attitudes
towards this explanation are skeptical, because there have not been sufficient analyses to support it. 
“That was actually the question here [the reduction of personnel expenditure] and the end
result could be that we are overburdening some people who are very capable and very talented,
we pile much work on them and they break and we lose a very capable person, we’ve drained
him… and those are consequences and connections that we don’t see at first.” (Vollmer, 2009)
“I have heard that it [the new solution] is less expensive, but I haven’t seen the numbers.
(...) Well, let’s say there are two motives for what happened. First, in the Republic of Estonia
integration is not the politicians’ favourite topic… Estonian politicians would rather not deal with
it (...) The second is most likely that it saves money. The minister’s salary, whatever she received.
I think that the savings are rather marginal though, compared to other fields.” (Heidmets, 2009)
Conclusions and recommendations
Integration policy in the Estonian society is a field that requires horizontal coordination, as
it is carried out by many different institutions. Until May 2009, a minister without a portfolio
coordinated integration policy in Estonia; however, afterwards it has been the task of the
department of diversity and foreign relations at the Ministry of Culture and the respective deputy
Chancellor. It can be deduced from the analysis of Peters that a minister without a portfolio has
more difficulties bringing the priorities of their field to the forefront in the cabinet, since he or she
lacks the support mechanism that other ministers with ministries have. In order to strengthen this
position, he proposes the option of giving the responsibilities of a minister without a portfolio to
a forceful persona who is valued on the political landscape. 
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Unfortunately, the cabinet that gained power in 2007 did not do this, since Urve Palo was
a newcomer to politics, whose activities until then had been in private business. The second
option for strengthening the ministerial position is to give it to a person who has close ties to the
prime minister, which would ensure the prime minister’s strong support. However, this was not
done either in the cabinet that rose to power in 2007, since the prime minister was from the
Estonian Reform Party and the population minister from SDP, and the positions of these two
parties on integration are radically different. For the Reform Party that subscribes to market
ideology, integration is a marginal topic that will resolve itself, however, for the more socially-
minded SDP, it is one of the central problems in the Estonian society that needs constant attention.
This contradiction could be considered to be the main reason for demolishing the old system,
meaning that the institution of the Population Minister existed until it was needed to keep the
coalition intact. When the coalition was disbanded and the Social Democrats left the coalition,
the other coalition partners no longer had a reason to maintain the position. This also implies that
the topic of integration is very heavily politicized in the Estonian political system and in the society
as a whole. Besides, decisions related to the field are often made not based on administrative
rationality, but on the interests of political parties. This was something our respondents also
noted:
“Maybe that [position of Population Minister] does not have to be so politicized. The
Population Minister was our so-called propaganda minister, she brought the topic to the forefront,
but at the same time I am not saying that the position should have been eliminated. … We have
to pay attention to this topic, but it can’t become propaganda, with big posters, etc. Of course,
at certain times it is important to raise awareness.” (Reimaa, 2009)
The main conclusion of the analysis is that the system of integration policy coordination that
existed in Estonia until May 2009 did have its flaws, but did not require a fundamental change.
The positive side of the previous system was that there was one minister in charge of defending
this field’s interests, whose attentions had been focused on one specific topic, not distributed to
several subsections of a ministry. The central coordinating institution brought together all parties
connected to the field, which guaranteed the representation of different views and the opportunity
of negotiating, but also clearly designated the responsibility. 
Creation of a new system most likely will entail several new problems that did not exist in
the old system. It is not realistic that every institution has a clear idea of what is going on in the
different areas of integration in a situation where different departments of ministries related to
other fields are involved, for whom integration is a secondary issue. A link is missing between the
different institutions. While in the old system the existence of a central institution responsible for
coordinating integration policy ensured that the topic remained active in the government and was
recognized among the population, this need is not covered in the new system. Finally, since there
are no analyses that justify the change, except for a minimal and somewhat questionable
expenditure decrease, then it can be concluded that in this case the decision has been a political
one, rather than one made with the objective of making integration policy more effective. 
Recommendations
1. The new system is not adequate for effectively managing the field of integration. If the
minister without a portfolio is reinstated, the problems related to the population minister’s
insignificant influence among other ministers needs consideration. To ensure that his or
her voice is heard, the minister without a portfolio needs the Prime Minister’s full support.
In the Estonian context, where the integration issue is heavily politicized, this position
requires their political connection.
2. However, on the strategic level it can be stated that the creation of an effective integration
management model requires the depolitization of the field. The main method for
achieving this is including as many stakeholders as possible in the policy-making process,
creating an advisory structure with the respective institution that would include
representatives from different state institutions, minority representatives, and also public
figures and politicians. This would bring different visions to the integration policy process
and would serve as a forum, where possible solutions could be found.
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Part II
Public discourses 
on integration: anti-migrant 
and anti-minority rhetoric 
in old and new EU 
member states
The Rhetoric of the Right on Migrants and Minorities 
in 2009: Banality1 and Fear
Robert Gould*
My starting point is Verene Stolcke’s lecture, published in 1995, “Talking Culture: New
Boundaries, New Rhetorics of Exclusion in Europe” (Stolcke, 1995). In her description of the anti-
immigrant rhetoric used on the political right in the early 1990’s, which was also a period of eco-
nomic slow-down, she coined the concept of “cultural fundamentalism”, linking it to the idea of
national identity (widely overlapping with ethnic identity) predicated on the notion of cultural 
exclusiveness and internal homogeneity: “Collective identity is increasingly conceived in terms of
ethnicity, culture, heritage, tradition, memory and difference …” (Stolcke, 1995, 4). Then, as now,
political parties of the Right actively promote the view that immigrants’ and minorities’ cultural
difference constitute a political threat to national identity. 
The scholarly literature emphasises that many right-wing parties, and certainly populist 
parties, have taken advantage of the undermining of past certainties of personal and national
identity as a result of the processes of globalisation, and europeanisation (Geden, 2006, 209;
Krzyżanowski and Wodak, 2009). This has happened even in countries which have not had to
deal with the reconfiguration of national and personal identity since 1990. From early 2008 
onwards the added element of the downturn has added to the fragility of both types of identity.
2 “Alle politischen Parteien funktionieren über die Angst, über das Geschäft mit der Angst,” stated in the course of an
interview with Oliver Geden, 15 January 2004, reported in Oliver Geden, Diskursstrategien im Rechts populismus: Frei-
heitliche Partei Österreichs und Schweizerische Volkspartei zwischen Opposition und Regierungs beteiligung, Verlag
für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2006, p. 144.
3 Die Welt, 16 October 2009, article “Streit um Minarettenverbot erreicht Deutschland”. “Genau wie das Spiel mit der
Angst. Das gehöre zur Politik dazu, hat der SVP-Werber Segert vor ein paar Monaten der Konsumentenzeitschrift
Beobachter gesagt: “Es ist absolut legitim, dieses Gefühl anzusprechen, sonst geht die politische Botschaft rechts wie
links an den Leuten vorbei.””  And “In Zeiten, wo es der Gesellschaft gut gehe, könne er die Angst in der politischen
Werbung nicht ansprechen.”
4 The day following the anti-minaret referendum on 29 November 2009 in Switzerland the BNP had an approving ar-
ticle on its website: http://bnp.org.uk/2009/11/switzerland-takes-stand-against-islamic-colonisation/
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The corpus for this brief overview is composed of the following: the British National Party
(BNP) and Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ) publicity for the 2009 European Parliamentary
Elections and the BNP manifesto for the 2009 English County Council Election; statements dated in
2009 on the BNP, Jobbik, pro Köln and other “citizens’ movements” (Bürger bewegungen), and FPÖ
websites, as well as that of the Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs (BZÖ). Some of the Jobbik state-
ments were made in connection with the 2009 EP elections. The visual rhetoric of the campaign
of the Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) to prohibit the construction of minarets is also included.
The importance of language (discourse) in both conveying national identity and for con-
structing or influencing relationships between groups within a given society is accepted by scholar -
ship (Krzyżanowski and Wodak, 2009; Ellis, 2007; Wennerstein, 1994; Torfing, 2005; Martin,
1995; Hall, 1994).
Britain is included in this survey as that country has had visible minorities for the past sixty
years. Significantly, some countries in CEE have minorities of the same generation, in addition to
containing both older and also much more recently-arrived ones. Secondly, the BNP has a highly
developed communications strategy, including making extensive use of what is now the banality
of electronic communication, in addition to the use of what I call the banality of fear. 
Thirdly, populist right-wing parties are inter-linked across Europe (Grumke, 2006; Grumke,
2009) and there is clear evidence of exchanges on communication strategies (one example will
be demonstrated below). 
The Banality of Fear
In 2004 the prominent FPÖ member of the Lower House of the Austrian Parliament Eduard
Mainoni stated that “all parties work with fear, with the business of fear.”2 He then linked it specifi -
cally to the question of identity. A very recent statement of the use of fear in relation to identity
and minorities became visible in the Swiss Magazine Beobachter and in the German newspaper
Die Welt on 16 October, 2009. Alexander Segert, a graphic artist working regularly for the SVP
and the originator of the poster for the (successful) anti-minaret campaign in 2009, is reported
as saying, “The fear game, that’s part of politics. It’s totally legitimate to appeal to this emotion.
Without it, the political message just doesn’t get across.”3 He added, in English, “Keep it simple
and keep it stupid.” His anti-minaret poster for the SVP was quickly adopted in Britain by the BNP
as part of their anti-minority campaign (see below).4 Segert added a comment very relevant for
the current period, “In times when things are going well in society, I can’t appeal to fear.”
5 This is particularly evident with Germany. See, for example, Hans-Georg Betz, “The Growing Threat of the Radical
Right” in Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century, in eds. Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg: Frank Cass
London and Portland, Oregon, 2003, pp. 74–96. For Britain, see Adrian Blackledge, Discourse and Power in a Mul-
tilingual World, Benjamins: Amsterdam and NYC 2005 [on GB], particularly Chapter 4 “Political Discourse and the
Rhetoric of Discrimination” or Chapter 7 “The legitimation of discriminatory discourse.”
6 See the Daily Telegraph article of 8 August, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/5994047/Muslim-Europe-the-demographic-time-bomb-
transforming-our-continent.html
7 http://bnp.org.uk/policies/immigration/
8 http://bnp.org.uk/tag/third-world-colonisation-of-britain/ Posted on 1 April 2009.
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The Banality of Topics
Much of the discourse of radical right-wing parties represents little more than a radicalised
version of mainstream positions promoted and defended by established political parties5 and in
some cases of the mainstream media also (Jäger, 1996; Jung, Wengeler and Böcke, 1997).6
The topics and wording are well known. In political communication the importance of being able
to build on existing topics and terms, but turning them to one’s one purpose, is axiomatic. The
successful campaign centred around the term “multiculturalism” in the Latvian newspaper Lat-
vijas Avīze in 2008 which forced the withdrawal of draft guidelines on integration policy is a re-
cent demonstration of this. All across Europe foreigners, minorities, migrants are “banal” targets
for the right, as is the EU itself, and international business. 
Rhetorical Strategies
The premises on which virtually the whole rhetoric of the right rests in 2009 are in line with
Stolcke’s views: the ethnic “nation” as the foundation of all values and the idea of cultural ho-
mogeneity within the “nation”. Accompanied by the notion that the boundaries between ethno-
cultural groups are fixed, these ideas constitute Cultural Fundamentalism. Personal identity is
thus rigidly fixed within group identity. This is an important point for my final remark on how this
rhetoric works.
The master topos of the rhetoric is catastrophe and the destruction of the national identity,
culture and prosperity by alien values held by minorities and migrants within the country – in-
cluding their religion and their “lack of a work ethic” – and by economic problems which are 
portrayed as the result of external factors and influences – including international business (in the
case of Jobbik clearly a code for Jews), globalisation and europeanisation (BNP, FPÖ). It is clear
that any reference to a catastrophe is designed to create fear.
Examples of Human or Natural Catastrophe Topos 
The BNP speaks of “the overwhelming and extinguishing of Britain and British identity under
a tsunami of immigration”7 and of “Britain... being ethnically cleansed of its indigenous popula-
tion.”8 The threat extends, it states, to the whole of Europe: “The BNP has been the only party 
to warn about the coming demographic tidal wave which, if left unchecked, will extinguish all of
9 “Controlled Media admits that Europe is being overrun by Islam,” 13 August 2009, http://bnp.org.uk Accessed 15 Sep-
 tember, 2009.
10 “Massenzuwanderung aus der Türkei nach Österreich.” (www.fpoe.at)
11 See http://www.providus.lv/public/27124.html
12 Published in the Budapest Times on 27 May 2009, accessed on www.jobbik.org
13 Posted on 30 March, 2009.
14 Posted on 5 February, 2009.
15 Reported in the article on the BNP in www.en.wikipedia.org and on http://www.jobbik.com/jobbik-announcements/
3016.html in October 2008 Nick Griffin spoke at Jobbik`s rally in Budapest to commemorate the 1956 uprising:
“Nick Griffin at the Jobbik rally”, www.jobbik.com Posted 25.10.2008. 
16 “About Jobbik”: http://www.jobbik.com/about_jobbik.html Accessed on 16 September 2009.
17 Gábor Vona to Benedikt Frings, 28 March 2009 “Zum Beispiel hat das ungarische Volk große Probleme mit den
hiesigen Zigeunern – in Bezug auf deren äußerst unverhältnismäßig große Kriminalitätsrate und der bei ihnen ausge -
prägten Arbeitsunwilligkeit”, http://www.jobbik.com/deutsch.html Accessed on 15 September, 2009.
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Europe and bring an end to thousands of years of Western civilisation.”9 The FPÖ speaks of “Mass
migration from Turkey to Austria.”10
As the “Shrinking Citizenship” monitoring project in Latvia has shown, the rhetoric of “in-
vasion” and “occupation”, although referring to past events, exists also in Latvia where it has a
continuing impact on minority relations – and also on notions of cultural separation and cultural
and linguistic protection.11
Catastrophe of Subjugation/Colonisation
Hungary. In an interview shortly before the EP elections12, Kristina Morvai, head of the Job-
bik list, stated “We no longer want to serve international high finance in such a way that Hun-
gary becomes a colony, the people sink into poverty and become slaves in their our country.”
This implies a catastrophic loss of identity. 
Britain. The tag http://bnp.org.uk/tag/third-world-colonisation-of-britain/ is among the largest
collection of articles on the BNP website. “Colonisation” implies control by outsiders, and im-
plicitly reduction of living standards. The tag contains such articles as “The Tory/Labour plan of
colonising Britain with third-world immigrants is proceeding apace…”13 or “The colonisation of
Britain by Third Worlders has reached epidemic proportions.”14 This topos is likely to be partic-
ularly effective in England, with its history of colonization, but now it is the English who are pre-
sented as losing political control, their cultural identity, and being subjugated. That the same
topos is used in Hungary, which has no colonial history, is striking. Is this a product of the re-
ported meeting in London on 16 May 2008 when BNP leader Nick Griffin met leaders of the Hun-
garian Jobbik to discuss co-operation between the two parties?15
Minorities
For both Jobbik and the BNP, Roma are particular targets. On the Jobbik website, the ex-
clusion of Roma is extreme and the “problem” is worsening. The fundamental statement is:
“…one of the underlying problems of Hungarian society, the unsolved situation of the ever grow-
ing gypsy population.”16 In an interview on 28 March, 2009 Gábor Vona, leader of Jobbik,
stressed their “disproportionately high crime rate and their unwillingness to get a job.”17
18 “Roma Murders Benefiting Witch Hunter Draskovics and Ilk”, www.Jobbik.com, dated 9 August, 2009, accessed
on 27 October, 2009; http://www.jobbik.com/about_jobbik.html accessed on 16 September, 2009; “Bajnai’s First Visit
Abroad”, dated 23 June, 2009 http://www.jobbik.com/hungary-news/3081.html Accessed on 22 September, 2009.
19 Poster “FPÖ-Veto gegen freie Fahrt für Ost-Kriminelle” and “FPÖ-Veto gegen EU-Asyl-Wahnsinn”, www.fpoe.at
Accessed on 11 August, 2009.
20 Zukunftsakademie Österreich, Eine Erfolgsgeschichte: BZÖ: 113 orange Initiativen, Ideen und Reformen für Öster-
reich, http://www.bzoe.at/download/BZOE_Erfolgsbilanz.pdf Accessed on 31 August, 2009.
21 “Immigration isn’t Working”: http://bnp.org.uk/policies/immigration/ Accessed on 13 August, 2009. 
22 Section “Kriminalität stoppen” in the Programm für die Wahl zum Rat der Stadt Köln for the municipal elections
on 30 August, 2009. www.pro-koeln-online.de Accessed on 11 September, 2009.
23 See also Erste Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Adenauer, 20 September 1949,
http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.820/ Accessed on 18 October, 2009.
24 “Programm für die Wahl zum Rat der Stadt Köln 2009”, www.pro-koeln-online.de Accessed on 11 September, 2009.
25 “Abendland in Christenhand” – FPÖ election poster for EP election, www.fpoe.at Accessed on 11 August, 2009.
26 “Controlled Media admits that Europe is being overrun by Islam”, http://bnp.org.uk/tag/muslim-invaders/ Accessed
on 15 September, 2009.
27 “About Jobbik”, http://www.jobbik.com/about_jobbik.html Accessed on 16 September, 2009.
28 Subtitled video viewed on www.jobbik.com 14 October, 2009.
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In the BNP 2009 County Council Election Manifesto Roma were mentioned twice, each time
negatively. Given their tiny numbers in the United Kingdom this is striking. The manifesto stated:
“We will oppose the creation of more traveller and gypsy sites in our communities” – which 
doubly excludes this group through the use of “our” and “communities” – and “We will not allow
gypsies to move in and disfigure the local environment and terrorise the local community.” Is this
a result of the BNP/Jobbik linkage? Or, alternatively, are Roma a symbol for all “others” who are
not pale skinned?
Significantly, these group distinctions lead to the notion of two types of crime: native and 
migrant/minority, for example, in Hungary, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Jobbik 
repeatedly draws attention to “Gypsy crime”18; in its EP election posters the FPÖ speaks of “Ost-
Kriminelle” and phony asylum seekers, “many of whom are criminals”19; the BZÖ expresses the
view that revocation of citizenship should be possible “for reasons of state security.”20 For the BNP
a criminal conviction would be reason for post-sentence deportation of naturalised UK citizens.21
The Cologne-based Pro Köln party draws attention to non-German crime.22
Christianity and Islam 
Both before and at the very beginning of the Federal Republic of Germany the idea of a
“christlich-abendländische Kultur” [the Christian culture of the West] occupied a prominent role
in CDU politics and also came to be largely synonymous with “Europe” (Kämper, 2001).23 Cur-
rently, this important part of European, and national, identity is presented as under threat from
Islam in Germany,24 Austria,25 Switzerland (see below), and the United Kingdom.26 In Hungary,
although Islam is not mentioned, Jobbik defines itself as “a principled, conservative and radically
patriotic Christian party. Its fundamental purpose is protecting Hungarian values,”27 and as the 
climax of her speech on 1 May 2009 opening the EP election campaign one of the party leaders,
Krisztina Morvai, quoted the parable of the Good Shepherd in Chapter 10 of St. John’s Gospel to
attack mainstream parties for not protecting Hungary from foreign influences.28
29 Krisztina Morvai, Budapest Times, 27 May, 2009, viewed on http://www.jobbik.com/jobbik-announcements/
3076.html 23 September, 2009.
30 Rubrics “Einkommen zum Auskommen” and “Beste Gesundheit statt Billigmedizin” on www.fpoe.at Accessed on 
11 August, 2009.
31 http://bnp.org.uk/tag/britain-is-being-colonised-by-the-third-world/ Accessed on 15 September, 2009. 
32 Leaflet “Fünf-Punkte-Plan zur Ausländerrückführung” of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands on
www.npd.de; rubric “Beste Gesundheit statt Billigmedizin” on the Austrian Freedom Party website www.fpoe.at
Accessed on 11 August, 2009.
33 www.pro-koeln-online.de Accessed on 5 December, 2009.
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Economic Situation
In this period of an economic downturn where a significantly increased number of people are
living with reduced incomes, dependent on social assistance or even facing the prospect of a
longer period without work, arguments asserting that minorities are a burden on the economy are
rhetorically powerful. In Hungary it is stated that the “Gypsy question” created by a “large and
growing population” is so serious that it can only be tackled within the framework of an interna-
tional programme and with the help of special ‘financial and professional resources.”29 Although
ostensibly phrased in terms of the integration of Roma into society and the labour market, the re-
ception (perhaps so intended) is likely to be negative. In Austria, the FPÖ claims that resident mi-
norities depress wages and have “exhausted” health and social welfare funds.30 This latter position
is equally shared in Germany and Britain. There also, the theme of unfair claiming of social bene -
fits by foreigners and minorities is prominent (BNP,31 NPD, pro Köln), as it is in Hungary.
Following the logic of the assertions that minorities and foreigners are a disproportionate
burden on social benefit funds, the exclusion of foreigners from these has been proposed in Aus-
tria and Germany. Foreigners would have a separate fund into which only they would pay and from
which only they would draw.32
The Banality of Electronic Communication
The importance of the press in conveying views of minorities is widely agreed (Krzyżanowski
and Wodak, 2009; Van Dijk, 2005). It is likely that as the role of electronic communication in-
creases, it will have increasing importance in this area. The SVP poster in the anti-minaret ref-
erendum campaign in mid-2009 showing rocket-like minarets and a woman in a black burqah
dominating the Swiss flag, the rapid adoption and adaptation of the poster by the BNP, followed
in December 2009 by the adoption of the same basic image by Pro Köln in its campaign for the
2010 North Rhine-Westphalia State Parliament elections,33 is one aspect of rapid and easy com-
munication of visual anti-minority rhetoric on the political right. In addition, the “Fact” slogans at
the bottom of the British version are identical with slogans used by the FPÖ for the EP elections;
only the party names have been changed.
Figure 1. The SVP poster 
in the anti-minaret referendum campaign, 2009.
Figure 2. The BNP “Fact” poster.
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Figure 3. Pro Köln poster, campaign for the 2010 
North Rhine-Westphalia State Parliament elections.
34 Daily Telegraph, 13th September 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1562960/BNP-website-is-the-
most-popular-in-politics.html
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Websites. The BNP is certainly the best website of British political parties, and far superior
to those on the German extreme right. According to an independent press report it is the most
visited of British party websites.34 This report is credible. The site is never stale; it is updated every
day, and is always topical. It contains a wealth of materials and reports, and the articles are
heavily interconnected with numerous tags and also by means of links to external websites. It is
also the most virulent in its opposition to minorities. The Jobbik sites in both English and Hun-
garian are well developed; the FPÖ site has recently been upgraded. 
The BNP site has its own social network, in addition to using a very wide range of other so-
cial networks. It contains links to local/thematic/regional groups. It makes very good use of head-
lines, images and text; it provides access to telephone updates. There is extreme consist ency in
the rhetoric of the many articles. The website has an important function in that at any time of
the night or day people can get new information or reinforcement of their views without being seen
at a public meeting. This is particularly important for any party in an environment where its views
and rhetoric are held to be outside the mainstream.
At the moment it is not clear exactly where electronic communication in political and social
matters is going, how it will develop, how it will affect the relationship between the citizen and
35 Evgeny Morozov, Yahoo Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, author of For-
eign Policy’s net.effect blog (http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com) on the programme “The Agenda”, tv Ontario, Thursday
15 October, 2009. 
36 It also undermines the self-image of minority groups: see Michał Krzyżanowski and Ruth Wodak (2009), The Poli-
tics of Exclusion: Debating Migration in Austria, Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick N. J. and London, p. 173;
also Blackledge, p. 179.
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the state. We do know, however, that nationalists and extremists are the most intensive users of
electronic social media in Russia.35 It is clear also that organised political minorities (including
extremist ones) are more powerful than disorganised and scattered ones. As the penetration of
computers into the new EU Member States of CEE develops the importance of electronic com-
munication in the political arena is likely to grow. 
Some Conclusions
Discriminatory rhetoric applies to all levels of government, to all sectors of the economy,
and to a very wide range of issues; as such it is all the more powerful. There is increasing stig-
matisation of minorities and migrants and consequently no creation of solidarity with them. In ad-
di tion, there is no presentation of individuals within minorities; “they” are always a group, a mass
who, economically, socially, culturally, are harming “us”. In times of economic fragility this threat
is rhetorically particularly effective, further endangering social cohesion.36
Rhetoric does not in itself constitute threats to individuals. However, by making individuals
believe that they are an inseparable and integral part of the national group, any threat to the 
nation becomes a threat to the individual also. Consequently the rhetoric is more likely to be ef -
fective and promote resistance to the outsider. Any process of setting up opposition to this rheto -
ric needs to take into account not only the immediate pragmatic situation but also the premises
on which it is based. A good rhetorician always attacks the premises of the whole of the oppo-
nent’s argument.
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Ethnic Rhetoric in Latvian Politics: 
the Parliament and the Media as Loci of Ethnic Disourses 
Maria Golubeva, Iveta Kažoka*
The impact of the global economic crisis on Latvian society has been particularly hard also
due to the structure of the economy in this Baltic State. Relatively large share of the government
sector in the economy made the reduction in public sector salaries (implemented as part of the
cost-cutting agenda) a major factor contributing to the general sense of insecurity. Nevertheless,
protests against the public salary cuts and social expenditure cuts were half-hearted and weak,
and there has been no substantial political mobilisation of the population. One of the factors 
behind this political passivity may well have been the ethnic divide in Latvian politics.
As pointed out by Vanhuysse, in the 1990s, politicization of the ethnic divide in Latvian so-
ciety may have been an important factor preventing the social mobilisation of those who stood
to lose something from economic reforms (Vanhuysse, 2009). A similar observation has been
made by Bangura: “In bipolar societies, when ethnicity is politicized, the division may run through
the system, making it difficult to construct cross-ethnic alliances. Groups face each other directly
and politics may be zero-sum.” (Bangura, 2006) This paper analyses the political framing of 
ethnic difference in Latvian public discourses in 2007–2009. 
Political parties and the rhetoric of ethnic mobilisation
Latvian society is characterized not only by a high degree of ethnic diversity, but also by sig-
nificantly high rates of inter-ethnic marriages and by robust workplace integration and economic
cooperation between members of different ethnic groups (Zepa, 2006; Hazans, 2010). At the
same time, there is much evidence to suggest that the discourses of identity and threat reproduced
by major political parties and the media in Latvia work against political cooperation between citi -
zens belonging to two main ethno-linguistic groups. Latvia has been characterized by researchers
as an ethnically bipolar society (Bangura, 2006). 
Ethnic mobilisation is still high on the agenda of a minor coalition party (Fatherland and
Freedom) and is never completely away from the agenda of most other parties in the Parliament.
The data collected by the Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS during a three-year monitoring of
parliamentary debates in Latvia demonstrates that political parties in the Latvian Parliament 
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routinely found ways to attribute blame for the Soviet past and for current political problems to
the ethnic/linguistic minority. Russian-speaking “non-Latvians” remained the group most frequ -
ently targeted by members of Parliament using delegitimising rhetoric in plenary sessions of the
Saeima (Parliament) in 2007 and 2008. In 2007, in 56 cases exclusionary rhetoric was directed
against the “Russian-speakers”, as compared to 32 cases when such rhetoric was used to exclude
or blame non-citizens (permanent residents whose families settled in Latvia after the occupation
of 1940 and who did not undergo naturalisation after 1991). Collective blame for tragedies in
the past of the nation is attributed mainly to the ethnic/linguistic group which is seen as “alien”,
to the extent that one could claim that the rhetorical opposition of “native” and “alien” is a foun-
dational rhetorical figure structuring the political discourse of some parties (Busse, 1997, 17–35).
In 2008, the use of exclusionary rhetoric to undermine the legitimacy of minority groups has
fallen considerably compared to 2007, but members of Fatherland and Freedom (a ruling coalition
party during part of the period in question) continued to reproduce this rhetoric in Parliament
and in the media well into 2009.
In many cases, the argumentation used to attribute blame to the Russian-speaking popula-
tion as a whole is based on the unspoken premise that it was mainly the foreigners or “alien”
groups who supported totalitarian regimes. This is mainly possible because in Latvia, the meth-
ods of dealing with the transgressions of the Soviet past have been mostly political and restricted
to the domains of citizenship legislation and memory politics. There has been no comprehensive
case-by-case adjudication of individual guilt for concrete acts committed against individuals or
groups of people in the interests of the Soviet regime (Wezel, 2009). The absence of a clear 
adjudication of individual guilt permits the attribution of collective blame for the crimes of the
Soviet regime to the entire Russian-speaking population of the country.
The rhetoric of blame for Soviet oppression and Russian imperialism, while referring to real
traumas in national history, is used to structure the political sphere into those who can be rec-
ognized as legitimate political actors (for parties that label themselves as “Latvian” these are pri-
marily the ethnic Latvians and ethnic Latvian politicians) and those who cannot be allowed to
have influence (often named simply “Russians”, a conveniently vague term that can include any-
one from external and potentially hostile figures like Vladimir Putin up to ethnic Russian citizens
of Latvia, who have the same legal rights as ethnic Latvian citizens). Avoiding the establishment
of more clear criteria of belonging and legitimacy allows the parties that have termed themselves
“Latvian” (in ethnic terms) and that have made up all governments since 1991 to preserve the
political status quo, based on the ethno-cultural definition of the nation-state. Denying the legiti -
macy of the “alien” Russian-speaking part of society, MPs from “Latvian” parties reinforce the
ideological assumption that it is the ethnic nation (and not a civic nation, consisting of all citizens,
including recently naturalized ones) which is the foundation of the state. The shifting multiple
identities of the Russian-speaking population of Latvia, subject to media influences from Moscow
and very heterogeneous in political beliefs, make this ideological strategy easier. To quote a 
recent article on this subject, “the Russia factor structures Latvian domestic political space, 
discourses and identities – the context within which historical narratives are shaped and trans-
mitted… Ethnic Latvians have had difficulty taking a healthy distance from Russia, while 
many Russian-speaking Latvians have immersed themselves in Russian media, information and
cultural spaces, shutting themselves off from the respective Latvian spaces” (Makarov, 2009,
150–1).
37 “Latvijā projektē Bābeles torni”, Ināra Mūrniece, LA, 19.02.2008.
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Rhetoric of ethnic closure in the media
The printed media in Latvia frequently support ethnic mobilization and portray the ethnic
Other as dangerous to the political stability of the Latvian society and state. Thus, the Russian-
language newspapers Vesti and Chas routinely portray ethnic Latvians as the unjust winners of
social and political changes since 1990, while the Russian-speaking population of Latvia is de-
picted in the role of oppressed minority that has not benefited from the social and political
changes following the end of the Soviet era (Cheskin, 2010). Both newspapers often employ
rhetorical self-marginalisation strategies which “highlight the impossibility of working with Lat-
vians and further exacerbate the ethnic divide” (ibid). As a response, the Russian-speakers are
invited by these media to mobilise around implicitly Soviet or Russian symbols associated with
the 9th of May celebrations. The Soviet tradition of celebrating the end of Second World War on
a different day from the rest of Europe thus serves as a marker of Russian identity which is also 
emphasized by current ideology of the Russian state. 
Among the Latvian-language media, the popular daily newspaper Latvijas Avīze regularly
opposes the concept of a civic nation not based on ethnic criteria. In 2008, a series of publica-
tions in Latvijas Avīze condemned the ideas and practices of what it termed “multiculturalism”
in today’s Europe and warned against their spreading in Latvia. The campaign had a political pur-
pose (declared in several publications by the editors and the journalists): to prevent the adoption
of a more liberal integration policy in Latvia. In a series of publications in the newspaper, pre-
suppositions of a hidden connection between the agenda of “multiculturalists” and that of Rus -
sian foreign policy were created, which proved sufficient to isolate the adherents of multicultural
policies. The newspaper succeeded in mobilising MPs and the then Minister of Culture Helēna
Demakova against the draft Integration Guidelines developed by a working group that included
representatives of minority NGOs and human rights organisations. As a result the draft Guidelines
were cancelled. 
Before the series of publications in 2008, the word “multiculturalism” was comparatively 
little used in political debate in Latvia, and was mostly evoked in academic contexts or by NGOs
working with diversity issues. Out of the whole spectrum of possible meanings of the word 
“multi culturalism” – description of demographic diversity, political ideology, policies and institu-
tional transformations intended to accommodate diversity, opportunities for cultural manifesta-
tions, and other related meanings (Vertovec, 2001), only two meanings of “multiculturalism” –
description of diversity and political ideology – have been familiar in Latvia. The series of publi-
cations in Latvijas Avīze thus was designed to serve a double purpose: to introduce the Latvian
mainstream public to the term “multiculturalism” and to invest it with expressly negative social
and political connotations, representing multiculturalism solely as a hostile political ideology. 
The campaign against “multiculturalism” began with a large introductory article published
under the title “A Tower of Babel is being designed in Latvia.”37 The focus of the article was on
the negative side effects of social and cultural diversity in west European societies, and only opin-
ions critical of multiculturalism as ideology or simply negative about the presence of cultural 
diversity in Europe were given space. Next, the (negative) reactions of readers to the idea of a new
38 LA,16.06.08.
39 LA, 19.02.2008.
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“multicultural” policy were published, establishing a parallel between non-European immigrants
in West European countries and the “Russians” or “Russian-speakers” as irresponsible objects of
integration. Early on, the notion that Europe on the whole has already rejected multiculturalism
was introduced, thus excluding the notion of “multiculturalism” from the European norm:
“In all the European Union people start to slowly come to their senses and understand
that under the cover of multiculturalism hostile groups of immigrants destroy the cul-
ture, traditions, morals and even security of all the Europe and of individual nation
states. Europe will need to take action in order to stop these threats, and it seems that
the disposition of the majority of the society is similar. In Latvia, these subversive ac-
tivities are carried out by the defenders of Russian imperialistic ideology.”38
The newspaper introduced the presupposed connection between Russian imperialism and
multiculturalism and continued to emphasize the “untrustworthy” nature of Russian-speaking 
population in subsequent publications. A typical example of this rhetoric is given in the quota-
tion below:
“… It seems that the willingness of … “multiculturalists” to drag more multiculturalism
into Latvia means a badly concealed project to transform Latvia from a nation-state
into something similar to a state of two communities. The anti-state … activists of
Russian organisations also have urged the transformation of Latvia into a bi-community
state, to grant official status to the Russian language, to establish “proportional” par-
ticipation of minorities in government and state administration, as well as to allow non-
citizens to vote, and similar things…”39
The result was that multiculturalism was shown to benefit only the outgroup, or a “collec-
tivized social actor” (Riesigl and Wodak, 2001) identified with the Russians and sometimes with
Russia itself. Thus any idea of a policy approach focusing on the positive value of cultural diver-
sity in multiethnic societies was discredited, and multiculturalism was interpreted as a synonym
to Russian imperialism. The topos of contamination of (supposedly) pure national cultures by the
Soviet regime, imposing internationalism as a form of symbolic and social violence, was evoked
in a number of publications. Rather than allow for a new framing of the notion of Latvian citi-
zenship, based on unified civic values but allowing for membership of persons from different cul-
tural groups, the publications in Latvijas Avīze for the most part reinforce the hierarchical vision
of relations between ethnic groups in society. This strategy could hardly be successful without the
familiar frame already used by political parties: the attribution of blame for the transgressions of
the Soviet period to the Russian-speaking Latvians as a group. Both the rhetoric of mainstream
media and the rhetoric of part of mainstream political parties thus worked in support of what Tove
Malloy describes in Part I of this volume as “ethnic closure”.
Conclusion
In order to assess the implications of the rhetoric of ethnic difference and mobilisation in Lat-
vian public discourses, it is important to keep in mind three significant aspects mentioned above:
the distorted communication between the Latvian-language and Russian-language public spheres
in Latvia (when each audience is addressed by its own distinct set of media and political parties),
the bias created by the journalists and politicians as mediators, and the historic context of blame
in the Latvian collective memory and political discourses. 
On the whole, the language and strategies of ethnic blame in the Latvian Parliament and
media reveal a disparity between the ideological world of the MPs and journalists – binary, based
on ethno-cultural and geopolitical oppositions, and structured by historical blame – and the real
world of today’s Latvian society, dynamic in its multiple identities and characterised by a high 
degree of cooperation between ethnic groups. It remains to be seen if the rhetoric of the Latvian
Parliament and media will change in due time to enable and reflect political cooperation between
different ethno-linguistic groups.
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Part III
A school of democracy? 
Segregated schooling and 
civil enculturation 
of minority and majority 
students
Divided Education – Divided Citizens? 
The Results of an International Study in Estonia
Laura Kirss*
Introduction
This article outlines some of the results in Estonia of the international comparative study 
“Divided Education – Divided Citizens?” (DEDC) conducted by the Network of Education Policy
Centers in 2008 and 2009. The DEDC study aimed to assess the civic attitudes of students and
teachers in separate schools with majority and minority language of instruction in 8 countries.1
In other words, the study asked the question whether future citizens are raised in a different way
in schools with different language of instruction within the same country. This was done though
comparing students’ and teachers’ attitudes towards issues related to the concept of democratic
citizenship (e.g right to participate in policy processes, right to protest, gender equality) and also
their attitudes towards the issues related to separate schooling.   
The study comprised three stages: firstly, a preliminary analysis of relevant state policies
and practices regarding separate schooling of different ethnic/linguistic groups, then interviews
with policy makers and focus groups with students, and finally, a representative questionnaire 
survey carried out among teachers and students. The survey covered 15-year old students 
(9th graders in Estonia) and their teachers. Altogether, 835 students and 252 teachers filled in
the questionnaires in Estonia. 
Figure 1. General education schools with different language of instruction in Estonia 1998–2008.
(Source: Statistics Estonia, Ministry of Education and Research)
Number of schools with different languages of instruction
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The study adopted Amir and Sharan’s theoretical model (Amir and Sharan, 1984) as an 
analyti cal basis for the study. The model includes four sets of variables affecting school segregation:
a) structural variables (schools’ legal status, funding, public perception);
b) variables of role behavior (teacher-student relations, language and social status, power 
relations);
c) variables related to goals and values (perceptions of history and citizenship, future pro-
jections);
d) affective variables (attitudes towards segregation and towards the prospects of deseg-
regation).
In Estonia, the study addressed and compared majority schools (i.e. schools with Estonian
language of instruction, hereafter Estonian schools) and minority schools with Russian language
of instruction (hereafter Russian schools). Bilingual schools were left out of the study.
Majority and Minority schools in Estonia
In Estonia, majority and minority schools function on an equal legal basis. The language of
instruction should be the only one differentiating factor between majority and minority schools.
The curriculum for all comprehensive schools is the same in Estonia. In terms of funding, schools
with Russian language of instruction have recently been in a more favourable position as language
immersion and increased teaching hours in Estonian language have been additionally financially
supported by the state. 
2 Public higher education in Estonia is almost entirely provided in Estonian.
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Even though formally in an equal position, majority and minority schools seem to function
in considerably different working environments. While demographic decline is a major issue for
both Estonian and Russian schools, it appears to affect Russian schools more seriously. Figure 1
below depicts the changes in the number of schools with different languages of instruction. The
decline in the number of Russian schools has been considerably greater than it has been in Esto -
nian schools. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education and Research forecasts the future decline
in student numbers to be also more dramatic in Russian schools compared to Estonian schools. 
One of the factors influencing the minority school student numbers is the growing share of
ethnic Estonians in Estonian population, but other factors related to the changes in society and
schools system also play an important role. The social value of Estonian language has been gain-
ing importance among the minority population. This reflects in the increasing popularity of lan-
guage immersion programmes and growing number of bilingual schools. The share of students
studying in Estonian language has gone up from 71% in 1998 to 80% in 2007 (Statistics Esto-
nia). The importance of Estonian language in terms of future study and work opportunities seems
to influence the choices of parents and students increasingly.2
In addition, education experts have pointed out that the choice in favour of Estonian schools
has been fuelled by the changes occurring in the education system. Namely, the Russian schools’
transition to Estonian language of instruction at secondary (gymnasium) level has been one of the
driving forces. Parents of minority school students have become worried about the level and qual-
ity of teaching in Russian schools as the Estonian language proficiency among Russian school
teachers is supposed to be low. Parents questioning the quality of education in Russian schools
prefer Estonian schools in order to secure more competitive education for their children.
Lower Estonian language proficiency among Russian school teachers does not only affect the
choices of parents and the effectiveness of the education reform in Russian schools, it seems to
have a wider influence on the education results of minority students. PISA 2006 revealed rather
extensive differences across minority and majority schools, majority schools outperforming mi-
nority schools in all subjects. The most substantial difference occurred in reading.
In sum, it could be said that minority schools in Estonia function in a considerably less
stable environment compared to majority schools. Even though Estonian schools are also currently
experiencing many changes (demographic decline, school reform, new curriculum, etc), Russian
schools seem to have been caught up in a wider array of issues starting from the language bar-
rier of teachers and ending with quality issues and leaving students. 
Findings
Taking into account different contexts in which Estonian majority and minority schools func-
tion, this could be expected to have implications on students’ and teachers’ attitudes and views.
The following sections will outline the most important findings of the DEDC Estonian study. 
Figure 2. Number of friends of other mother tongue among majority 
and minority students, %.
How many friends of other mother tongue (Estonian/Russian) 
do you have? (%)
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1. Contacts between majority and minority students are not wide-spread
The results of the DEDC study reveal that neither majority nor minority students as a rule
have close contacts with students of other mother tongue. 28% of Estonian school students and
35% of Russian school students do not have friends of other mother tongue. One third of students
in minority and majority schools have 2–5 friends with another mother tongue. The increasing
number of non-Estonian students studying in majority schools could be one of the reasons behind
somewhat higher levels of interethnic contact among majority students. Still, these results point
to the continuing relevance of activities targeted at facilitating interethnic contact. For these joint
activities to be successful, it is critical to base these activities on students’ mutual interest. 
2. Low levels of interethnic contact lead to misconceptions and negative attitudes
Taking into account the fact that many students both in majority and minority schools do not
have close contacts with students of other mother tongue, it could be expected that students’ at-
titudes towards other ethnic groups in society are not revealing positive tendencies. It is rather
common that something unknown is considered to be primarily bad or negative. The study results
do reflect the same principle. For instance, even though more than 50% of the majority students
do not regard minority as dangerous, almost 60% of minority students think majority considers
minority to be dangerous. Here seems to be a clear gap in communication and contacts that
could be overcome with joint youth projects and activities. 
Estonian students (%)                                      Russian students (%)
Figure 3. Estonian and Russian school students’ attitudes regarding majority 
and minority relations, %.
Figure 4. Estonian students’ views on minority political participation, %.
Is it good if there are politicians from minority group in the government? 
(% of Estonian students)
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3. Consensus on the idea of political inclusion, but in reality inclusion is not accepted
According to the study, both majority and minority school students (79% and 82% accord-
ingly) agree that when making important political decisions it is necessary to take into account the
opinion of all ethnic groups in society. Although Estonian school students seem to accept the in-
clusion of various ethnic groups into the political process on the normative level, they demonstrate
Students’ attitudes (%)
Figure 5. Majority and minority students’ beliefs concerning civic participation, %.
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less favourable attitudes when actual political participation is discussed. One third of majority
school students think that Russian-speaking people have too much influence on politics in Esto-
nia. And as Figure 4 shows, only one-fifth of Estonian school students regard having minority
politicians in the government as a positive thing. 
4. Minority students reveal lower levels of confidence in civic participation
The results of the study reveal very important differences between majority and minority stu-
dents in their civic participation attitudes. As Figure 5 depicts, minority students seem to reveal
remarkably lower levels of trust in the effectiveness of their participation in the political sphere
and in other spheres of civic engagement (environmental issues). While approximately one fifth
of Estonian majority school students are skeptical of their actions’ impact on government policies,
more than half of Russian minority school students doubt that their actions can have effect on
government policies. The same applies in case of dealing with environmental problems: 61% of
majority school students believe they can make impact on solving problems of the environment
whereas just a little above one-third of minority school students think the same.
Teachers’ questionnaires in Estonia show the same comparative lack of trust in the effect of
own participation among Russian school teachers. The minority estrangement pattern reflected
among the Russian school students is apparent among their teachers as well. The teachers in 
minority schools feel considerably lower levels of empowerment compared to the majority school
teachers. As the attitudes of teachers are difficult to influence, it is vital to pay more attention to
civic participation issues in extracurricular and out-of-school activities for students from minority
schools. More attention needs to be paid to facilitating school (classroom) democracy and sup-
porting greater inclusion of minority youth in civil society organizations.
Students’ attitudes (%)
Figure 6. Majority and minority school students’ attitudes towards gender equality, %.
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5. Minority students tend to support more traditional gender roles
When comparing majority and minority students’ attitudes on gender equality issues, it can
be seen that Russian minority school students tend to reflect somewhat more traditional views
than majority school students. As Figure 6 shows, minority school students agree less often than
majority students that women should have equal career chances with men. Minority school 
students also hold more often the opinion that “Men make better political leaders than women
do.” These results suggest that minority school students have possibly been less exposed to 
modern civic values. Again this points to the need to pay more attention to gender equality issues
in students’ extracurricular activities. Study materials and textbooks should also be reviewed from
a gender equality perspective.
6. Diverging views on historical events
In two types of schools, the students’ views on historical events are dramatically different.
Despite the unified curriculum, the way majority and minority students regard different historical
events differs greatly. For instance, less than 30% of minority students agree that in 1940 Esto-
nia was occupied by the Soviet Union while 59% of majority students have the same opinion. The
civil enculturation environments of majority and minority students are very different from each
other. Minority students’ home background, the views expressed by teachers as well as the Rus-
sian mass media create a vastly different version of history compared to that envisioned in the
official curricula and that held among majority students.
Textbooks are one of the key issues in history teaching. As historians in Estonia have pointed
out, it is very complicated to teach history to minority school students when textbooks depict 
Students’ opinions (%)
Figure 7. Majority and minority students’ views on historical events, %.
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Russians only from a negative perspective. The survey also revealed that Russian school teach-
ers do perceive textbooks to be unfair and depicting stereotypes. In cases when teachers think
textbooks provide unfair interpretations, they tend to correct the textbooks using other sources of
information (as indicated in questionnaire replies). Minority teachers tend to use Russian text-
books more often. But it also happens that Russian school teachers, more often than Estonian
school teachers, while presenting the official curriculum content add that their personal view of
history differs. It has been claimed that the mode of history teaching in minority schools resem-
bles the Soviet time when Estonians were in class learning the “formal” history while at home and
among friends a “non-formal” version of history was discussed. This study shows clearly that the
question of history teaching in schools requires further discussion. The issues of hidden curricu-
lum and multicultural history teaching need to be addressed when revising curriculum. Further-
more, the inclusion of both minority and majority history teachers is critical in the process of
curriculum development. 
7. Minority students and teachers highly support the existence of separate schools
Even though the minority school student population and the number of minority schools is
decreasing in Estonia, the demand for separate schooling seems to be strong among the minor-
ity students and teachers. The study reveals that more than 90% of the students and teachers 
in minority schools support the existence of separate schools. The minority school teachers and
students are also rather pessimistic about the perspective of all students – both majority and 
minority – studying together. Minority school teachers are convinced that even though studying
together would increase the minority students’ proficiency of the majority language, it would be
Do you think if all minority students went to majority schools, the effect wouuld be... 
(% teachers)
Figure 8. Majority and minority teachers’ views on the effects of abolishing minority schools, %.
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achieved at the cost of losing cultural identity (see Figure 8). Minority teachers are also skepti-
cal about other possible effects of joint schooling. At the same time majority school teachers 
believe that studying together would facilitate greater openness and trust between ethnic groups
as well as a more unified national identity. Minority students are slightly less pessimistic than their
teachers about the possibile effects of joint schooling but still reflect rather similar attitudes. 
Conclusion
This study has in many ways drawn attention to the different environment in majority and
minority schools in Estonia. Minority schools seem to experience much higher levels of insecu-
rity which has had effects on the processes of teaching and learning. The study results presented
here have pointed to many ways that majority and minority students’ views and attitudes differ
from each other. Civil enculturation processes in two types of schools seem to be significantly dif-
ferent, with history teaching and participation attitudes being the most vivid examples. 
The DEDC study results have clearly pointed out that there is room for greater interethnic
contact facilitation. Although this has been on the agenda for many years, so far no visible rap-
prochement on history and civic participation issues between the two communities is in evidence.
Furthermore, civil participation of minority youth needs greater attention – youth organizations are
a good channel for that. Gender issues could also be addressed through youth organizations. His-
tory teaching is one of the most critical issues that needs to be addressed in the near future. 
One of the issues this study has also raised is the future of Russian schools. Even though
there appears to be a demand for them among minority students and teachers, the current ten-
dencies in education seem to suggest that future demand for minority schools is questionable. De-
creasing student numbers, teaching quality concerns, teachers’ language barrier and parental
preferences are factors threatening minority schools. Probably a new generation of teachers –
proficient in Estonian language and educated in Estonia – could bring about positive changes 
affecting the whole minority school environment.
Finally, the study outlined the concern of minority teachers and students about losing their
cultural identity in majority schools. Majority schools having larger numbers of minority students
should address this concern by providing opportunities for strengthening their cultural identity
though elective courses or extracurricular activities. 
* Linda Curika is project manager at the Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS in Latvia.
3 For the international report on the study, see M. Golubeva, S. Powell, E. Kazimzade, A. Nedelcu, Divided education,
divided citizens? http://www.edupolicy.net/images/doc/dedc/dedcreport.pdf
4 “Latvijas pilsētu sociālekonomiskās attīstības tendences” // http://news.frut.lv/lv/ppl/society/60800 Last opened
23.02.2010.
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Civic Attitudes in Separate Schools in Latvia
Linda Curika*
In this paper I will address some of the main issues concerning the practice of separate
schooling of ethnic majority and minority students in Latvia. The main findings of this paper will
be based on the researh conducted in Latvia in 2008 and 2009, within the framework of the
comparative international study Divided Education, Divided Citizens?3
How does a general education system divided along the lines of language and ethnicity
influence the civil enculturation of students and the students‘ and teachers‘ opinions of societal
diversity? What is the impact on students as new citizens – are they ready for civic participation,
and are they encouraged to participate? There has been a world-wide discussion about the
importance of giving students knowledge about democracy, and it has reached Latvia as well.
Civic education problems are a great part of latest discussions about the quality of education and
skills which students acquire during the educational process.
School is not only about knowledge and preparation of a person for further professional or
academic education. It is not just about knowing facts and learning how to read, write and count.
It is also about giving practical tools for real life, for example, an understanding how to make in-
dependent political decisions, reasonable choices for civil participation and if necessary to protect
one’s rights.  
Civic education has to put emphasis on tolerance education. This is so not only because
Latvia has 30% of ethnic minorities, and in some regions only 17.9% of the population are
Latvians. A lot of Latvians emigrate to oher countries with even more linguistic, religious and
ethnic complexities. Are they ready to live there and become a part of those societies? Also,
eventually Latvia will have to receive immigrants, since population is declining steadily. 
In the context of findings of the DEDC study in Latvia, I would also like to adress some myths
which are typical for public debate in the country. Firstly, there is a belief that Latvians are a calm
Nordic nation and tolerant people. The reality is that one in 5 people in Latvia has a strictly nega -
tive opinion about gay people, 53% would not like to live with Roma as neighbours, 37.7% – near
immigrant workers, 25.5% – near Muslims.4
5 Bilsena, L. Par vardarbību skolās. Diena, 5.06.2008.
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If we speak about school environment, on average one of four students in Riga has
participated in violence against one of his schoolmates, one in four students in Riga thinks that
he or she might participate in violence, and 40% of students say they would not try to help a
person assaulted by others in the street.5
Another commonplace of Latvian public debate is the hope that the problem of divided
society is a problem which will be solved after old generation passes away: young people,
Russians and Latvians, are supposed to share common interests, goals, career oportunities.
Unfortunately the data from our research shows that a divided school system educates Latvian
school students who have not been in contact with Russian students and vice versa. Focus group
discussions show that in such a situation, it is very easy to form stereotypes about the other
group. Interaction between school students of both largest ethno-linguistic groups in the country
is low. Therefore the opinion that we only have to wait for change of generations may be naïve.
Parallels can be found with political life, where minorities are represented by separate political
parties, at which mass media and majority politicians look at with a suspicion. Still, both majority
and minority school students believe that dividing people according to their ethnicity is not a
helpful way how to look at society (from survey findings).
Another myth is that ethnic separation is only a matter of political debate and in everyday
life there are no problems between Latvians and Russians. That is also not true as far as divided
schools are concerned – for example, a great part of Latvian school students believe that it is not
important to take into consideration the interests of all ethnic groups when making political
decisions.  A considerable percentage – 30.4% – of students in Latvian majority schools believe
that Russians already have too much influence on politics in Latvia. Focus groups in our research
showed that in some cases there is open hostility towards the other group. 
There is mutual distrust between two largerst ethno-linguistic communities in Latvian 
schools – 50.3% of “Russian” school students think that Latvians think they are dangerous, and
23.1% of Latvian school students agree to that statement. Minority school students believe that
Latvians no not respect them, and vice versa.
Teachers and students in “Russian” schools believe that their chances of effective political
participation are lower than for Latvians, and that they do not have similar career oportunities.
Also, 57.1% of teachers in “Russian” schools think that social status of “Russian” schools is lower than the
status of “Latvian” schools. 
Research shows that there is a low interaction ratio between Latvian and Russian students –
about 90% of students from “Russian“ as well as from “Latvian” schools make majority of their
friends inside their ethno-linguistic group. This ethnic division between schools reflects insufficient
connection between students in real life, which might lead to prejudiced opinions about the other
group, force students to follow stereotypes and make it difficult to live in any multicultural
environment.
“Russian” school teachers and students perceive ethnic stereotypes in school curriculum.
More than a half of teachers agree that curriculum shows the “Latvian” point of view on historical
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events. In such situations minority school teachers have a tendency to react and “improve“ offi-
cial curricula, voicing an opinion that differs from the textbook interpretation of history, or pro-
viding supplementary materials which they believe to be more fair. The fact that teachers and
students in “Russian” schools think that curriculum contains ethnic stereotypes may be linked to
serious estrangement from official state policies.
History questions are particularly polarising in Latvia, though the issue of “unfair” history
curriculum seems to worry teachers more than students. While similar percentage of students in
types of school agree that history curriculum is fair to both etnic groups, minority teachers tend
to agree less – 56% of teachers in “Latvian” schools believe that representation of both groups
is fair in history books, while 85% of teachers in “Russian” schools disagree.  
Teachers in “Russian” schools tend to challenge the content of history curriculum more
frequently, which leads to different interpretations of historical events among majority and minority
school students – shown by the DEDC study as well as by other studies in recent years (Makarovs
and Boldāne, 2009). It is important not to force teachers to teach the “right version of the
history“, but to maintain an open debate about history questions in the curriculum, in order to
arrive at an interpretation which both respects historical research findings and gives minorities a
sense they are represented fairly. 
Students in “Russian” schools feel more alienated from politics – teachers and students are
less confident in the effect of their own participation on government policies, and also feel less
protected by state. At the normative level, students in both types of schools believe that it is
important to protest against wrong political decisions, but more than a half of Russian teachers
and students think that their actions will not change anything.
In the case of teachers and students in the “Russian” schools, it is possible to speak about
a certain minority alienation model, when minority representatives believe that curriculum and
political system is not fair to them, and that their participation would be politically futile.  
Table 1. Civic participation orientations in majority and minority schools in Latvia
Statement “Russian” school “Latvian” school
Teach Stud Teach Stud
If the government accepts an unfair law, 85.7 83.2 85.8 87.8
it is right to protest against it
My participation cannot change anything 50.8 50.5 29.5 32
in government policies
Today it is already clear that due to the budget cuts, a lot of Russian schools will be closed
and are being closed already, because smaller number of students study there. At the same time,
most majority and minority school students – 63.9% in Latvian schools and 78.9% in Russian
schools – think that the separate schooling system is good. Russian students are relatively more
open to the opportunity to study together with Latvians. On the other hand, they also tend to
support the concern that a common schooling system would threaten their cultural identity.
6 For example, Makarovs V., Boldāne I., 20. gadsimta vēstures pretrunīgo jautājumu pasniegšana Latvijas skolās un
muzejos. Soros Foundation – Latvia, 2009. http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=17096 // Last opened 19.02.2009.
Russian-speaking students see “Russian” schools as an important protecting factor for their ethnic
identity. Majority school students show no concern over the hypothetical loss of ethnic identity of
Russian students. This corresponds to the findings of other studies6 which say that Latvian
students see the relationship between both groups through the assimilation scenario, where all
Russians eventually become Latvians. Most teachers in “Russian” schools believe that the current
system is good – and about half of “Latvian“ school teachers agree to that. 
Although some of the problems, like low group interaction ratio, will be solved in years to
come without any intervention because of the closure of “Russian” schools, other problems will
not disapear if they are not adressed. If we do not want to live in an ethnically divided society,
where one part is alienated from the state, some actions are required. Firstly, it is very important
to encourage informal connections between students from both ethnic groups. Secondly, instead
of forcing the “Latvian view” on historical fairness through curriculum, curriculum should be made
through a process in which members of all major ethnic groups can participate. Thirdly, students
in “Latvian” as well as “Russian” schools have a fairly low trust in the effectiveness of their own
civic participation and insufficient knowledge about tools of participation – it is necessary to
consider introducing a separate subject for citizenship education. Fourthly, political situation,
which is characterised by assymetric power relations between largest ethnolinguistic groups in the
country, creates necessity for teachers and students in “Russian” schools to emphasize ethnical
identity instead of civic unity.
Also, it is very important to remember that actual practices in the classroom are crucial to
teaching democracy. Do teachers who have to teach about participation believe it themselves? 
It seems they do not. If we really want schools in Latvia to be schools of democracy, we still have
a long way to go.
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Referātu kopsavilkumi latviešu valodā
Merja Pentikainena (Somija) analizē starptautisko organizāciju un ES valstu izpratni par to,
kas ir integrācija un kāds ir tās sakars ar cilvēktiesībām. Autore norāda, ka integrācijas jēgas
noteikšanas process bieži ir ideoloģisks un retorisks, un neiesaista visas puses, ko skar integrācijas
politika.
Tove Maloja (Dānija) piedāvā visaptverošu skatījumu uz multikulturālisma izpratni mūsdienu
politikas zinātnē un uzsver, ka nopietna diskusija par kultūru dažādības politiku mūsdienu valstī
nav iespējama bez kultūras pozitīva sociālā potenciāla izpratnes. Pētniece norāda uz nepiecie -
šamību papildināt integrācijas politiku ar kvalitatīvi jaunu pieeju – dažādības vadību, kas prasa
nevis tikai retoriku vai ārvalstnieku integrācijas pasākumus, bet arī fundamentālas izmaiņas valsts
institūcijās.
Īvs Plasro (Francija) salīdzina “vecās” (tradicionālās) un “jaunās” minoritātes Eiropā un
pamato, kāpēc, viņaprāt, šo grupu tiesību regulējumam Eiropā jāpaliek dažādam. Pētnieks ap -
skata arī Latvijas krievvalodīgo minoritātes situāciju šajā kontekstā.
Židas Daskalovskis (Maķedonija) savā referātā stāsta par starpetnisko attiecību regulējumu
Maķedonijā pēc Ohridas Līguma, kas noteica kvotas maķedoniešu un albāņu līdzdalībai valsts pār -
valdē. Pētnieks uzsver, ka proporcionālas pārstāvniecības un kvotu princips ir pieļaujams, lai
īslaicīgi nodrošinātu sociālo un politisko taisnīgumu dažādu grupu pārstāvjiem, tomēr tas nevar
būt ilglaicīgs risinājums.
Feliciana Rajevska (Latvija) apraksta sociālās politikas vietu Latvijas valsts integrācijas poli -
tikā un analizē iemeslus, kas noteica sociālās politikas un integrācijas politikas kā tādas salīdzinoši
zemu prioritāti valsts un politiskās elites dienaskārtībā. 
Raivo Vetiks (Igaunija) savā referātā analizē par integrācijas politiku atbildīgo institūciju
reorganizāciju Igaunijā. Pamatojoties uz ekspertu intervijām un valsts pārvaldes teoriju, pētnieks
secina, ka reorganizācijas rezultātā par integrāciju atbildīgo institūciju funkcijas ir sadrumstalotas
un nav nodrošināta atbilstoša politikas koordinācija.
Roberts Gulds (Kanāda) analizē Eiropas radikāli labējo partiju retoriku, kas vērsta pret imi -
g rantiem un dažreiz arī pret tradicionālām minoritātēm (romiem). Politiķu ksenofobiska un pie
bailēm apelējošā retorika tiek analizēta no komunikācijas perspektīvas kā banālas ideoloģijas un
banālas komunikācijas izpausme.
Sagatavota iespiešanai SIA “Nordik”. Reģ. apl. Nr. 2-0792. Adrese – Elijas ielā 17 (1. stāvā),
Rīgā, LV-1050, tālr. 67602672. Iespiesta un brošēta Jelgavas tipogrāfijā.
Marija Golubeva un Iveta Kažoka (Latvija) analizē etnisko retoriku Latvijas politisko partiju
un mediju izteikumos. Referāts atspoguļo Saeimas debašu un mediju monitoringa rezultātus un
pievērš īpašu uzmanību etniskajiem argumentiem Saeimas debatēs un mediju publikācijās. Pēt -
nie ces arī analizē Latvijas Avīzes kampaņu pret “multikulturālismu” 2008.–2009. gadā.
Laura Kirss (Igaunija) stāsta par salīdzinošā starptautiskā pētījuma “Divided education,
divided citizens?” rezultātiem Igaunijā. Pētījums atklāj nepietiekamus kontaktus starp igauņu un
krievu skolu skolēniem, kā arī krievu skolu skolēnu un skolotāju neticību saviem spēkiem ietekmēt
politisko dzīvi valstī.
Linda Curika (Latvija) analizē pētījuma “Divided education, divided citizens?” rezultātus Lat -
vijā. Pētījums norāda uz salīdzinoši zemu savstarpējo uzticēšanos starp latviešu un krievu skolu
skolēniem un skolas nespēju sagatavot skolēnus aktīvai pilsoniskajai dzīvei 21. gadsimtā. Autore
uzskata, ka, lai audzinātu demokrātiskus pilsoņus, skolai pašai jākļūst demokrātiskākai.
